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Global military 5pending is decreasing. HOI'.'ever this trend does not apply to 
some regions of the world, specifically Southeast Asia. This thesis descrihcs the 
ongoing naval arms buildup in this region and examines why it is occurring when the 
rest of the world is dl'HCasing military spending. Next. thi s thesis asks if this anns 
huild-up is dangerons. Unlikc many other arms races around the world, the Southeast 
Asian build-up is not particularly dangerous because of the parallel development of 
confidence and security building measures 
I answer this question affinllalively and then examine the causes of this situation. 
Using t~lree countries as case studies -- Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia -- I argue 
that a combination of three factors fuels an anllS race. The three categories which 
d rive a naval anllS race arc economic growth, changes in perceived threat, and 
prestige. Thai Ilaval expenditures are affected by all tll ree factors in roughly equal 
proportions. Singaporean expendiOires are driven by economics and prestige 
considerations. Changes in Indonesian spending are the result of security and prestige 
considerations. 
The next question is whether the anns race is daugerous. Nations in the region 
have engaged in serious effons to establish effective confidence and security building 
measures which /lave mitigated the negative effects of an affilS race. As long as these 
efforts cOlllillue, there is litlle danger in the alms rdce degenerating into amled conflict. 
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Global military spending i~ decreasing However this t rend does not apply to some 
regions of the wolld , saecifically Southeast Asia. This thesis describes the ongoing naval 
anns buildu p in this region and examines why Jl is occurring when most orlhe rest of the 
world is decreasing military spcnd ing Nex" this thesis asks iflilis a['ms build-up is 
rlar.gerous_ Unlike many ot her rapid arms build-ups a[ound the world, the SOlllheast Asiar. 
one is not particularly dangerous because of the parallel development of confidence and 
security bu ildi ng measures 
There ex iS ts widespread disag[-eement as to how 10 cieline an arms racc, much less 
how to apply such a definition_ The codlict in opinion owr absolute leveis of spending 
a:];1 relative change in spenoing levels is a major part or this disagreement. The member 
nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nat i o[~s do not allocate vaSl SU:rlS of money 
fo[- defense (as compared to o! i1 er mlions of 5imilar size)_ The size of defense 
procurements have quickly inCJeasea over the past two decaries In a re lative sense this is 
an indication of an anns race. Based on the signifi~ant increases innilva \ acquisitions, this 
thesis makes the argument that severa! differen t types of racing can and do occur 
simultalleously. Natio ns ill the region engage in differe nt categories of arms raci:lg based 
on thei r regional status and their national amli it ions 
Using thn:e countries as case studies -Thailand, Singapore ar.d Indonesia - this 
thesis argue, that a combination of three necessary factors is fueling an alms rac!,;. The 
three categories which are driving a naval arms race are economic growth, changes in 
perceived threat, and prestige Thai naval expenditures are affected by all three factors in 
roughly equal proportions. Singaporean expenditures are driven by economics and 
prestige considerations Changes in Tndonesian spending are the result of security and 
prestige considerations. 
This thesis argues that economic growth spurs additio:1al defense spending The 
newly industrialized countries in ASIAN all have extremely high growth rates over the 
past two decades This eco nomic expansion is providing the t'Jcl for regional-wide 
growth in military expenditures 
Changes in perceived threat have altered the allocation of defense spending Most 
of the membcrs of ASEAN have had significant domestic problems with which their 
militaries have traditionally been preoccupied. For the most part these problems have 
been resolved in the past decade and the state security establishments have focused on 
external threats. The shift away from domestic threat to external threats has been 
reinforced by the 1982 Third United Nation~ Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS lJI). The rcdefinition of traditional maritime boundaries by UNCLOS lIT has 
forced nations in the region to pay more attention to maritime security 
Finally, prest ige cQ:l5ideratio:l5 have impacted arms purchases as these nations vie 
for status within tr.e region. Thailand is striving to elllerge as the regional Jeader - either 
of the Associat:on or of mainland Southeast i\.si.t. Singa::!O re is )) urchasing equipment to 
maintain its technological edge over its ncighbor~ Indone~ia fee ls compel led to aCfluire 
additional naval a5sets in order to maintain its position as regional leader 
The combination of these three factors has laid the basis for a n<lval arms race in a 
region which is geo-strategically important to numerous extra-regional powers . T1e 
United States has a cr itical interest in the 10:lg-term stabi lity of the region. The lack of 
American territorial i!lT'.bitions in the region enab les the Ur,ited States to playa unique 
stahilizir.g roJ..:, '.mlikt some other extra-regional actors SI!ch By virtue oflx~ i l1g 
physically distant fl"Om the region, the American presence i.'; considered to be a force 
which enhances regional stahili ty. The key to preventing cO:lfl ic t in the regio n appears to 
reside in the successful establishment of confidence and security build ing measures The 
naval arms race is occuning while tension retlucing efforts (!re Undef"'Nay 
A single event or factor can not be pointed to as the rO Ot c:ause of the naval arms 
race in Southeast Asia. The fact tha t tJadi t;onal security concern~ ;Jlay a relatively minor 
rcle in the development of the i\fms ~?ce:5 i,nportant. Past arms races genc '<l l!y have 
involved two nations working against ead) ot her, By deluons!rati ng the e!Tect that 
economics and prcs:ige h~ve on r:av<l l anr.s acclLli,itions, clearer understanding ofthe 




Southeast ASia has calmed somewhat since the end orlhe Vietnam war, but may 
be shov.;ng signs of increasing instability. As demonstrated by the South China Sea 
disputes and other maritime claims conDicts, tensions are on the rise Thc age-old 
question of whether weapons cause war is being tested day by day as nations in the 
regiun have purchased record amounts ofthc latest weaponry. What is fueling the 
instability and the resulting defense expenditures? 
This thlo:sis examines naval arms acquisitions among the member nations of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAl'l) Naval capabilities in the region have 
expanded dramatically. Partly because Southeast Asia is in an area where the oceans arc 
significant factors in the economic, political and military futures of each state, navics 
have a obvious role to play_ The convergence of geography, history, and a radically 
changed international ordcr has spurred the development of naval forces in the region to 
an unprecedented level. The goal of this thesis is to show what specifically is drivi ng 
increases in naval expenditures, explain why this is so. and discuss what policy options 
are availahle for the member nations and the United States to minimize the threat of an 
arms race escalating out of control 
In this investigatJon this thesis asks tv.'o sets of basic questions 
I) What are the levels of military and naval spending') How are 
the amounts are being spent? Are systems being purchased or built 
domestically? 
2) What. are the factors driving the acquisition of naval annaments? How 
are these factors affecting the decision-making process? 
These questions are addressed through an investigation of national case studies-
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. During the course of this thesis these questions are 
asked on an individual nation basis in order to later extrapolate regional trends from 
national motivations. These nations were selected because ofthcir various sizes and 
differing secrnit)' considemtions. As nations, they run the gamut from archipelago to 
city-state to land power. Because of the broad spectrum of national characteristics, 
significant increases in naval spending across the board would seem to indicate regional, 
vice national , trends. Possible causes of that change include shifts in security concerns, 
domestic structure or the international order. The remainder of this chapter examines 
the existing regional environment and methodology employed in this thesis 
Chapter 11 examines arms race theories, defines arms race and demonstrates why 
activity in ASEAN constitutes an arms race 
Chapters ill, IV and V are case studies and focus on one nation per chapter. In 
each of these chapters, naval acquisitions will be detailed and critical factors illuminated 
affectmg arms acquisition decisions. Such critical factors include past and present 
security concerns, domestic changes, international envirorunent perceptions, and the 
effect oflhc United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
The final chapter is an ovcmll asscssment, establishing whether there is an arms 
race and to what extent regional arms acquisition generalizations may be dra\\ll 
Common critical factors in the decision making proccss are identified and analyzed in 
additlOn the viability of regional confidence bui lding measures (CBMs) are ascertained 
Lastly, implications for U.S. naval forces and forcign policy are identificd 
B. REGIONAL BACKGROUND 
The ongoing naval arms build-up coincides with the highest level of intra-
regional tensions since the 1960s, a decline in consensus on extemallhreat, and a 
relaxation of external constraints (i.e. shifts in the global distribution of power) \ 
"Southeast Asia may be unique in that individual procurement decisions- regarding 
what bnd of weapons to procure, how many and from whom - will play an explicit and 
highly visihle role affecting the peace and stahility of the region."" The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is now comprised of seven nations, basically 
surrounding the South China Sea: BrwlCi, Indonesia, Ivfalaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thail:md and Vietnam (Fig. I-I)] Officially, the association was assembled m 1967 as 
an economic association ofthc first six (excluding Vietnam) to address common issues 
and prohlems, and was specifically designed not to be security group. Over time ASEAN 
has proved to he a launching pad for fora addressing security concerns such as the 
ASEAN post-ministerial conference (PMC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
' 1l>cre i, every md)"al,,,,, tho; Bunn~ (M)'arunar) and Cambodia (Kampuc1>ea) v>,1I11CCedc in the ~"ar fUlUle 

This concept is ref1i:cted in thc second oojectil'c as outlined in (hc ASEAN charter is "To 
promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the ruk of 
law in relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the 
Umted Nations CharteL '" Th..: ..:nd ofthl! cold war and the !,'l'adual aCCl!plancc oftht: 
Vil!tnamese regime undermilled whaf un irying forces have held ASEAN logl!ther in a 
scwrilY context. Member states differing r-:reerlions of economic problems and 
methods of resolution have done hUle to build cohesiveness in the association 
Figurc f. f A4al' o/.'\(JUlheos/ A.I'w 
' Unilcd SlalOS Na,y Dcl'",(mcn( Libo"'), ~Miw:<:!lli'nl'inASEAN~'i 5~ULhc.l!j\A " Jn 
~<).SdccLBibliog!J(ll","'> 2,). M:rrcl'I ')g') 

1. Regional J'oial'ies 
Wby are navies important in this region? "First, within South East Asia, the 
exercise of power depends on being able to make use of the seas within South East Asia" 
and historically "each state that flourished succeeded in contro1!ing the sea and the tradc 
that flowed across it'" As in no other region of the world, maritime endeavors arc 
critical to the survival of each nation The seas not only providc resources ranging from 
food to kelp to oil, but also strategic trade routes connecting East and West as well as 
North and South 
Secondly, each of the nations arc newly industrialized countries (Mes) trying 10 
enhance their relative positions in the world. A traditional mark of an influential 
international aClor has been Ihc ability 10 demonstrate power through a navy6 The 
convergence of geographic and economic influences highlights naval requiremcnts In 
fact, these nations have been able 10 expand their militaries relatively painlessly hy virtue 
of the ir rapidly growing economies.7 Not content v.ith simply expanding their 
capabilities, in each nation a new pattern of self-rclimlce and indigenous ""'eapons 
development has evolved - emphasizin?, the changing roles of navies in the n:?,ion 
Since 1980, an obvious shift to the purchasc or construction ofncv .. hulls has occw-red 
This need for new naval eq\lipment built 011 indigenous requirements signifies the 
increased maritimc threat and enhanced naval roles in each nation ~ 
' T"" C~ Heart, ColllffiOdo<e, Ch,d oflhe Navy, RqlUbijc ofSingal'O"', ")"hrit""" l'''",el in South Ea.,! Asia' 
~lli!!:~a.IJi!-~(No,'em~[1 ')91) . 11 
61anAntOOoy.~L~n~(Ne",York_ O,uordlJni,ersltyPre",19%). 155 
, MichaelA. M,'ms, F~~~I!JirJ1})'Qr)4..1:ill::ki (MwYOIk St Martm'. Pre", J987), 91 
' AnU:O!ly, JJ:lt_~~,2~.9 
In light of the exttnsivc changcs wrought hoth in the strategic tnvironment and 
naval forct structures ofthe rncmbtrs of ASEAN, it is of significant interest to both the 
Unites States Navy and policymakers to determine the nature of what is occurring 
Significant weapon acquisi tions have occurred in the past ten to fiftecn years The 
question to be answered is whether those purchases are exclusively security driven and 
what is influencing the acquisition decisions 
C. ACQUISITION 
Bctween 1985 and 1991, the trend throughout most of ASEAN has heen a 
significant increase in total defense expenditures (Table 1-1 ),9 These increases are within 
the range of increases throughout East Asia. The only way to financc tbese rising costs 
Country Change in defense spending without undue hardship is by 
Indonesia -19.34% piggyhacking growth in defense 
Malaysia +23.36% spending to expanding economics. This 
Philippines +42.86% is certainly onc luxury that all of the 
Singapore + 30.95% ASEAN states have been able to 
Thailand + 12.05% enjoy. For instance, the GDP per capita 
Table / -1 Changes in ASEAN De!e/l..\·e 
Spending 1985-1991. 
Source. F~, 72, 00. 3, (Summer 1993), p 
119. Originally based On SIRPI and IISS /l.-1ililary 
Balarfclb!iWlMl; 
has more than doubled for each of the 
nations between 1965 and 1990 (see 
Fig. 1_2).10 
What are some of the motivation behind thc increascd expenditures'? Defense 
planners may be using currenl good limes to prepare for future lean times. "In m:my 
cases, projecting futuTe economic performance is ditTicult, which means that short-tcnn 
availabIlity, opportlmism and reactive policies characterise the procurement process In 
il :veloping countries, the economic circum starh:es of which arc too uncertain to allow 
any long-term planning.,, 11 Instinctively defense planners never feel the nation is 
properly equipped with enough military resources and avidly watch for opportunities to 










Thai land Malaysia Singapore 
Figure 1-2 (;f)/ ' l'er ('aptfa Selected A.\'E4.N Na/iom . 
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Coincidental with the increase in naval tonnage, is tIle development of 
infrastructure, not only to support the recent naval acquisitions, but to produce parts of or 
entire warships. Significant tcchnology transfer has occurred thIoughoullhe n:gion, 
enabling the majority of these countries to provide many of the requlremcnts for new 
construction, especially in electronics_ Shipbuilding capability has also grO\\TI in these 
cOlmtries in SUpJXlrt ofthcir navies, and the production and repair of swelling merchant 
fleets_ Five of seven nations now have the domestic ability 10 prodm;c advanced fast-
attack craft (FACs) and patrol craft, with two nations quickly developing thc ability to 
produce corvettes and frigates,12 A prevIOus Naval Postgraduate School student in his 
thesis "developed a broad overall indicator linking naval power with national power-
thc <naval technology level ' -- which mcasurcs a country's ability to sustain and dcploy a 
navy effectively ."n The Jacoby study was panly successful at quantifying this 
relationshi p, but would require significant expansion in order to be useful in this thesis. I' 
The results though, clearly illustrated a growing 'naval technology level' throughout 
ASEAN. While this factor is important and relevant, it is not within the scope of this 
theSIS to examine the development ofmiliiary-industnal complexes within each nation 
It is sufficient for this discussion to know that there is a growing domestic capacity in 
each nation to produce weapons and systems 
Advances in tcclmology have also Sib'llificantiy impacted the development of 
Third World navies, and ASEA,~ navies in pa11icular. The proliferation of shoulder-held 
"Ibid 

5urface-to-air missiles, land-hased portable anti-ship mis~iles, FACs and land-based 
aircraft effectiveness have all increased the ability of smaller nations to inflict damage on 
aggressor naval forces without a build-up of 'blue water' capability. "PGMs (prccision-
guided munitions) make target acquisition almost synonymous with target dl>:struelion" ;~ 
and reprcscnt a significant hazard for the largest of navies. Combination of this advanel>:d 
technology with the more than 15000 islands oflndunesia ur thl>: more than 12000 islands 
of the Philippinl>:s adds whole new dimensions to defense for nations in the ASEAN 
region, significantly complicating matters for any potential aggressor nation. Maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft and dual usc fighters have entered naval air inventories acting as 
naval force multiplil>:TS. 
The development of the fast patrol craft armed with anti-ship missilcs (ASMs) 
has been a boo]] for devdoping nations. FACs are ideally suilt."'ri for territorial patrol and 
defensl>: of the nation from external aggressors The ability to launch attacks from 
anywhere witllin the archipelagos substantially increases the risk for aggressor nations 
Specialized crew requirl>:ments are also kept to the lowest levd unlike larger vessels. ](, 
These vessels have enahled devclopmg nations to establish credihle defenses at minimal 
cost However, Fl\Cs do have serious limitations. In essence they are single-shot craft. 
with little ability to remain in a battlezone. Additionally the limited range and patrol 
times are significant constraints on the regional navies as they take on more traditional 
naval rules. FACs wil! remain at the important in national maritime defeTl5c for the near 
future, even as the ASEAN nations embark on naval acquisition programs that include 
corvettc- and frigate-sized surface combatants 
The latest trend in ASEAN has been to purchase a few larger vessels for usc as 
command vessels as well as forward defense assets. While this is a natural evolutionary 
step, it is demonstrated later in the thesis that prestige considerations are also spurring the 
move 10 larger platfonns. Facilitating this upgrade in blue-water abilities is the buyers 
market that currently exists throughout the world. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and 
the Soviet Union has made available significant quantities of advanced naval weaponry 
at relatively incxpensive prices (not unlike the 1950s when the US. and U.S.S.R. sold its 
excess force structure to the samc region). In addition, declining demand in Western 
countries has forced naval producers in those countries to actively search out new 
markel<; and deals in order to stay in business. The result is the introduction of new or 
relatively new vessels into the region originating in East Gennany, unified Gennany, 
Spain, Italy, etc. Having grounded their naval capabilities in the smaller, but also 
modem F ACs and patrol craft, these nations have the abiJity to absorb new technology 
and systems in their defense structure Wllike their recent past, yielding far morc effective 
forces than have been a%ociated with this region to date. 17 They bave shed their history 
of purchasing Soviet, British and American castoffs as well as increasing their technical 
abilities to the point where new systems arc ea~ily and professionally assimilated into the 
force structure (unlike many of the other nations spending large amounts of money on 
defense). 
17 R:!'anm, Pfaltz!7'O' and Kemp, Arm' TumslCrJi 10 til<: Hurd Workt 13 
What then is going on? There is obviously a variety of events taking place in 
ASEAN. It is clear that some are related, and questionable as to whether others are 
Various logical explanations can be used to ~uppon one viewpoint or another about 
portion~ of what is occurring. Technology, prestige, economics, pressing security 
requirements all are suggested in the previous recounting of regional developments 
None of these competing drivers emerge as the most influential, A comprehensive 
analysis of what the overall driving influences are, and how they arc manifested is 
lacking, This is why this thesis has been wrinen 
D. El'oVmONMENT - REGIONAL THREAT SUMMARY 
To examine one of the most lOgical impetus for naval expansion, threat \0 
national security interests, threat must be divided into five categories: elClra-regional , 
intra-regional, resource acquisition, trade, and other. The most distinct class is the extra-
regional threat, wbich emanates from countries extemal to ASEAN, but are in the near 
vicinity and have the potential to disrupt current arrangements. China, for instance, has 
embarked on a dramatic naval modernization program, especially during the 1980's, and 
has a history of involvement in the region, especially in Malaysia and Singapore In 
addition, the Spratly and Paraeel archipelago issues are not to be ignored with five 
ASEAN nations as well as Taiwan and China all staking wrnpleting claims In this 
resource rich, potentially \'ioicm question, HI 
As a gateway 10 the Indian Ocean, ASEAN is also anxious over Indian intentions 
Certainly, India has developed a credible hluc-water threat, enough to cause significant 
' M:chae!T. K13T~, "1:n.:N""IGreaIArnts~>\for~1f;urli.72,no. 3 (SurruneJ 1993), 140 
concern among ASEAN countries should India begin looking outside of her 'lake' Not 
of small concern to ASEAN planners is the further possihility ofheing caught between 
India and China in some future conflict. 19 
Finally, the perennial fear ofa milit.·ui ly resurgent Japan seems to be gaining 
cause day by day_ The US insistence in the 1980' s that Japan assume security 
responsibilities out to one thousand nautical miles (nm) of Japan has done httk to dispel 
escalating fears. The memory of Japan's incursions in the Second World Wars still bums 
brightly in the national memories of all six nations. "Tokyo's recent decisions to send 
(noncombatant) peacekeeping forces to Cambodia -- the first overseas deployment of 
Japanese troops since World War ll-- has provoked much concern in Southeast Asia.""~ 
Expanding Japanese capability and a growing desire to act internationally on a level 
commensurate with her economic power have disturbed ASEAN leaders. The traditional 
US presence (at least since 1945) had minimized grounds for these fears , but the 
drawdown of US forces has facilitated a resurgence of these fears 21 While none of the 
ASEAN nations expect to bl;: invaded anytime in the near future, the current 
shapelessness of the future causes great concern for each ofthem.22 
'"Hcan, "Maritime P......-er in South f:<lStAsia;- J,>tU'1IaI ortheAtl-'lraliagNa~ II 
>OKlar",-·TheNo;tGreatArmsR:=",E.~~: 141 
" Hean, "Maritime Powcr in South East Asia," JOlUwl ,,[the Australian Na,allnilll!!lt: 12 
n A<X:OI"ding to Aebarya, " ASFAN Sla\CS note with alarm the ongoing "",,'e.; bytbcsc pow",s 10 develop e~pabilities 
that could be =:d roo- projecting power and lISSertiog infltlO>C" in the Soulh-«st Asian regioo Rut percepLiOllS of who 
rnight bc tn. nextrcgiOll"t hegcemc>nllfc by nO mearlS unifi"-m,,;(hinu,, grouping. \\'hilelndooesjaandMalayS!aha,~ 
e_'<jlres~ mi"givings about China 's pro"?CCli\'e m le, Singapore hos shown greater .. ~ty about Japanese 
remiliLarisation=ultingfrumth<:prospecti,"declineortbeUS -Jap""csesocuri!yn:lalio~p,Jnanye=,tbeshifl 
from the ,up"rpo",er toregJOfllII -power malry from the basis of curren! securit)' debates ,,·ilhm the region; with an 
impticit C<I»<e:o:;us thaI by seeling to bahmcccach ot.her, regiOllal powers may en~age in a COUlp"tition thai woo)d 
make a multipolar regional order much Ie.;s stable th.n the bipotllf Cold War 'y<;\em_ India '. rcren! moveS 10 cullivate 
the miJilllf)-' regime in E~ml3 to off"'" its growing security links w,th China is indican,e of ",Jd, regional oompc:tinOll " 
Acbarya,AJ::k~ionalOrdqinSo"Ih.EasIASla 13 
Lntra-regionally, Indonesia has typically been the catl~e of conceO! by simply 
being thc most powerful navy in the group In addition, lndonesia's aggrcssive move on 
Malaysia in the 1960s has not been forgottcn by anyone. On the other hand, Singapore 
has always feared acquisition by her much larger ncighbor, a fear which today may be 
slowly subsiding. "The military buildup in Malaysia evokes understandable concern in 
neighboring Singapore, as does the steady improvement in Indonesian capabilities. All 
of these rivalries arc balanced by grm.ving nade and political links within the region, but 
are nevertheless likely to figure in the long-tenn security plarming ofPacifi(; Rim 
states."n Klare's statement captures the essence of the dichotomous relationships 
between nei ghhors in the region 
A diminished land threat may also be influential in naval expansion. The long-
standing Vietnamese land threat has subsided freeing Thailand and MalaysJa especially 
to invest defense resources elsewherc. Indirectly, the diminished land threat has also 
created the opportunity to increase internal naval importance in the defense hierarchy 
This is not 10 say that the Vietnamese army of 700,000 docs not pose any threat to these 
nations (again Thailand espeeiallyfl , but the CUJTent Vietnamese forcign policy posture 
is one of accommodation vice confrontation 
Domesti(;aHy, mOSI of the nations stiH face limited insurgent groups. One oflhe 
roles oflhe armed forces, inc luding the navies, continues to the maintcnance ofintcmal 
ordcr and discipline. Unlike most other developing nations, each of these counlrie~ has a 
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marine corps, one of whose primary taskings is the preservation of central authority on 
outlying islands 
Irrefutably the roles of navies have grown dramatically, especially since the 1982 
UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Territorial st:as have been extended 
to twelve nm, and EEZs have been created eXknding certain sovereign and jurisdiction 
rights up to two hlllldred nm 2~ Territorialization ofthe seas carries with it the 
responsibility to maintain good order and discipline in these areas in order to retain 
controL of the resources contained. J.~ In addition, proper maintenancc of EEZs and 
territorial seas is viewed as an international ohligation the result ofthe international 
heritage of the seas. Expansion of maritime responsibility has two effects: one 
constabulary in nature, the other a demonstration of national wilL "Naval forces tasked 
for naval defence out to 200 miles \\~ll have at least some potential for deep water roles 
beyond the 200-mi le limit. Any Third-World navy which aspires to national control of 
the EEZ lVill he inclined to estahlish a secure perimeter or buffer beyond the EEZ in 
order to improve control of the national zone. Thus the roles within and beyond the EEZ 
are linked in Third-World security planning."n The impact ofUNCLOS has been to 
dramatically increase the area ofresponsihility of coastal navies. Complicating this has 
heen the issue of overlapping EEZ's and territorial seas. In a confined maritime 
environment, such as being discussed, overlap becomes a non-trivial issue. Developing 
the resources to effectively accompLish this has led ASEAN navies to consider a fOT\vard 
" Jacob!lorr~ "The Se.p<l""e1' oftht: Co~sUlJ State," Ge<.lffrcy Till. ed, x"power Tbeqry and f'racl;ce ; 148_9 
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defense strategy, engaging any threat as far out ~ possiblc -- a radIcal dcpanure from the 
navies of 10-20 ycars ago which revolved arolllld FACs 1!llil. coastal defenses 
Resource acquisition threats arc probably the newest prohlem. The increased 
emphasis on maritime resources coupled with the expansion of the terntorial seas and 
the creation ofthc Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have added greatly to pressures felt 
by coastal states in general. Fishing rights and rights of passage have been historic cause 
of maritime disagreements, but have now been overshadowed by the relatively recent 
discovery of energy resources in the coastal waters of the region As nations have moved 
into offshore operations, the need to effectively prote(.-t and regulate those activI ties has 
expanded accordingly. Traditional fishing concerns havc also increased as fish stocks are 
depleted and demand continues to grow 
The ending of the Cold War has had a similar dTect. As the Cold War was 
drawing to a close, international arrangemcnts loosencd, allo .... ing greater flexibili ty to 
act on thc pan of smaller natiom. The perceived global withdrawal of superpower fleets , 
especially that of the US, has accentuated this trend, creating impressions of power 
vacuums. From the ASEAN perspective, a perceived power vacuum is disaster, at all 
costs thcy must insure that a negative cost-benefit exists fo r any potential aggressor 
"With national resi lience [anned forces] in each country, there will be no weak links in 
the region to exploit, and by working together, there will be regional resilience and the 
region will be better prepared to face the ullkllOwn.,,28 China wcighs most heavily on the 
minds of ASEAN planners, but they also keep an eye to the future on India and Japan 
especially. The consensus bei ng a loose-knit conglomeration of regional naval abilities 
especially. The consensus being a loose-knit conglomeration of regional naval abilities 
,,\ill be enough to deter incursions from outside. Reduction of lIS presence, perceived as 
having maintained good order and discipline in the maritime region, has emphasized the 
important role of regional navies in continuing this mission 
Trade threats are a fourth category. Six of seven nat ions depend on maritime 
trade for their livelihood. Singapore especially, as wdl as Indonesia and Malaysia to a 
lesser extent, rely on maritime traffic through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and 
Singapore for crit ical percentages of their national well-being. There is li ttle chance that 
any of the ASEAN members would ever try to dose the straits, "in the long tcnn these 
countries are perhaps most dependent of a ll on keeping open the strategic waterv.'ays they 
control. since closure \\'ould upset their own economies more than anyone else' s. ""? A 
rdated issue is the problem of piracy which seems to have resurged in the last decade 
P irates are a growing force throughout the entire region, making their holdest attacks in 
the Malaccan Straits. Prior to the occurrence of the regional economic surge, piracy was 
a tacitly accepted act ivity. The boom has altered this, making trade security a vital issue 
v..fhat remains is the 'other' category, which ineludcs new, and difficult threats to 
national security. Illegal immigration (refugees) and drug smuggling arc the two highest 
profile concerns. These prohlems both require a specialization of assets and capabilities, 
drawing away from traditional missions and roles. megal immigration will probahly be 
thc most explosive issue, especially if the economies of ASEAN continue to grow as 
expected. How individual members and ASEAN as a whole deal with these problems 
will speak loudly to the intra-regional threat level. Resolution of these issues will not be 
,., Anthony. The N • .-a! Arru$ Trade. I ~R 
the result of naval activity, but any action will have a large naval component if only 
because of the geography of the region 
Beyond intra-regional threats are suspicions of neighbors basically caused by 
weapon acquisitions. While each nation claims modernization and contingency planning 
are the fat-1:ms behind recent acquisitions, these reasons offer little comfort to neighbors 
This is distinct from intra-regional threats addressed in the second hypothesis because 
those concerns are identified (i.c. contested borders, etc ). In this case, these threats are 
ill-defined and characterization can quite be possibly reactionary in nature Because of 
the relatively smalL size and limited military capabilities of each of these nations, they are 
obviously nol planning against a major Chinese, Japanese or Indian movement into the 
region. Who then are they planning their wntingency scenarios around? The only 
answer left is that they arc planning against their neighbors to some extent. For instance, 
the prospective delivery ofa Thai helieopterNISTOL aircraft carrier has caused great 
consternation among other members. Second guessing the motivation for acquiring a 
light carrier has returned few comforting answers to planners in the regionJO (This 
platfonn purchase, may in fact be a classic ex.amph: of a destabil izing weapon.31 ) The 
ramifications of carrier warfare are not lost on Thailand's neighbors 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
Based on the background information previously presented, and the debate over 
the characterization of an arms race, the best course to take is to examine each nation on 
a case by case basis_ It would appear that each nation has a nwnbcr of incentives and 
rusincentives for acquiring arms - some may be unique, others maybe common 
beTWeen nations . If the actor level of analysis holds true then more [actors ought to be 
different than the same (although they may be simi lar in nature). Three hypotheses will 
be tested based on likely factors driving the situation 
Variables: The dependent variable is naval acquisitions measured in terms of 
numbers of systems purchased, timing of purchases and types of purchases madc. The 
independent variables are: 1) national economic perfonnancc, 2) security thrcats , and 3) 
prestige 
Hypmhesis 1" If a nation ' s wealth increases, then its expenditures on defense also 
Rapidly growing regional economies are providing the financial resources to 
finance significant military expansions or modernizations_ This will be mea~urcd by 
examining growth in Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and then looking for corresponding 
growth in defense expenditures a~ percentages of GOP and Central Government 
Expenditures (CGE). Numerous authors such as James Payne32 , and David Hewitt, 
International Monetary Fund Economist (,"Military Expenditures Worldwide 
" J=LP"yue. ~(NcwY()Tk- BasiIRI",,"welJl"c. , J9R9) 
Determinants and Trends, 1972_1988,,33) suggest that as nations become richer they 
spe nd a greater proportion on defense matters 
Hypothesis 2: ifthere is a change in JX:rceived threat, then military forces are 
structured accordingly 
Threat may take various forms including domestic rebellion, external aggression. 
border conflicts and fallout from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS ill ). Dividing threat into two categories enables this thesis to engage both 
actual and perceived threats, Using a starl date of 1982, naval acquisitions arc indexed 
with respect toUNCWS III Growth in extra-regional fl eets arc measured (China, 
India). Last in the lIst of actual threat domestic security problems are assessed 
Finally, references made in official statements are used as indications of 
perceived threat 
Hypothesis 3 If a member nation makes a qualitative jump III wea]Xlns systems, 
then other states must follow it (the prestige factor) 
In an era of contingency planning, forces purchased meet national security goals 
(ostensibly extra-regionally driven), but also have a secondary effect of disturbing intra-
regional perceptions, i,e. other regional actors feel threatened by additional weapons 
pureha.<;es The overd!llow level of armaments (fleets that number in the tens and 
twenties and air forces that amount to a few squadrons) create an environment where 
each additional purchase is very visible and has an impact.3~ Michael Monis suggests 
that despite a rational underpinning, developing third world naval acquisitions are also 
driven hy prestige faetors,3s Dana Eyre and Mark Suehman argue prestige faetor~ are 
part ofthe state's seU:image, linking weapons acquisitions "'ith the image a state wants 
to projec/ 36 
Based on these hypotheses it will become dear that a naval arms race is occurring 
in ASEAN,37 The key element separating the arms mcc characterization from simple 
modcrnization is the rcgional shift to contingency planning and analysis of forces being 
purchased. These forces are not dcsigned to engage significant external power forces, 
but they are more than simple constabulary na\ies. So, while there are very real and 
lcgitimate reasons supporting modernization of ASEAN naval forces, it is the perceptions 
of the othcr mcmbers which arc affected in thc process which earn the label of arms race 
See.lso Darla E)TC and Marl.: Suchman. "StanIS. Norm. and the Proliferation ofC"",'cntional Weapons . An 
Ln:;\;l.Ot;onal Thc<lry Appro<o::h:' in Peter J Katzenstein. cd" Culture and National Security (New Vorl;.: 0l1wnbia 
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Case Selection: At this juncture, acquisition incentives seem to be outweighing 
disincentives (because or expenditure levels that have steadily increased) These 
incentives and disim;entives will be exaruined for the cases of Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Singapore. This selection of cases (a large maritime power, a medium land power, and a 
small city-state) wil! accurately cover the spectrum of arms purchasing motivations for 
the region. ASEAN is compose of three types of states-archipelagic (Philippines, 
Indonesia), continental (Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand) and small surrounded states 
(Brunei, Singapore). Choosing one representative from each category 1 hope to draw out 
any regional trends in the conclusion 
During each case cxamination il ",iH be necessary to establish the relationship of 
the hypotheses to eaeh other and thc likely role they play in the actor 's decision-making 
process. After each case is examined the results can then be compared and pattems 
established. I expect the predominant hypothesis 10 be different for eaell nation, but 
marginalized in each case \0 create congruity across the region. If the results indicate a 
strong similarity betv.een nations, then either the choice for level of analysis is in error 
(i.e. systemic, relational, or sub-actor reasons predominate) or the selected hypotheses do 
not accurately represent the criteria in the decision making process 

II. IS THERE AN AR;~S RACE? 
A. R;EVIEW OF ARMS RACE THEORIES 
Much of the discussion concerning the nature of acquisitions in Southeast A~ia 
hinges upon arguments over definitions. There is no singh: \\1dely accepted definition of 
an amlS race that may be used to evaluate the situation in ASEAN. Some of those 
contending positions will be laid out here as a framework for later discussion and as 
justification for the appropriate choice of definition I select one position and I;:xpand 
upon it for analysis oflhe ASEAN arrangement 
Lewis Richardson hegan the discussion \vith his anns race definition in 1960 
That interpretation posits a "two-actor model where arms increases were j::)OOitivcly 
related to the threat - the opponent's anns lcvcl-- and negatively related to the defense 
burden -- onc's O\Wl amlS leveL"]S This 'action-reaction ' definition nas become the 
classic departing point for all discussions about arms races lts limits though, an: 
obvious_ This definition precludes the possibility oftcchnological or industrial driven 
acquisitions, bureaucratic inertia., lobby groups, etc_ The simplicity of the model 
constrains evalualion of the Southeast Asian situation to a point where it becomes 
useless 
Another option, a definition that evolved in the early seventies, relies exclusively 
on endogenous factors_ Dicter Senghaas disputes the entire basis of the a(;lion-reaclion 
model and claims that arms races evolve from "self-centered imperatives,,39 He asserts 
that arms ra(;es develop from purely qualitative issues - that nations force themselves 
into rapid modernization in attempts to improve precision, reliability, and 
invulnerability.40 In this model, external forces arc considered only indirectly, 
specifically in assessing the vulnerability of one's OWIl systems. Unfortunately, this 
approach also offers little insight into Southeast Asian armament dynamics. For a "big", 
leading teelmology, great power nation this theory probably has some merit It docs not, 
however, translate well to a situation where the nations in competition arc second or third 
string in tcrms ofwcapons technology. These nations are vulnerable to an assortment of 
nations (China, Japan, ES and Russia) with technology and force projection capabilities 
that they can not hope to match at any time in the next twenty years. If considered on an 
intra-regional basis alone the argument has morc validity, but is still not a satisfactory 
explanation. Nom: of these nations arc pursuing hasi(; programs of research and 
dcvelopment in hopes that there will be future defense payoffs The ASEAN nations are 
purchasing technology and systems from outside suppliers in partial response to external 
developments and not due to a military-industrial complex bent on constant 
improvement. Thus as a motivator for an arms race, this approach seems to be wide of 
the mark. While qucstions ofpre(;ision, reliability, and invulnerability are natural 
,. D~~r Sffighaa., Allns R""" Dynamics and Ann~ Control:' in GledItSch and Nj~l"tad , ~~, !5,!6 
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questions of any national se(;urity system, thcse will most likcly nQl be the questions 
driving the acquisition train 
These two attcmpts laid the groWldwork for a divcrsity of other definitions of 
arms races ranging from the mllitary-mdllStrial complex to the bureaucrati(; politics to the 
techmcaJly possible. Gleditsch suggests that all the theories can be categorized at four 
levels: ( 1) internal - or subunits of the actor; (2) actor - the actor itself; (3) relational 
- relations between two or more actors; and (4) systemic - the social system or 
physical context. 4 1 Within these four categories arc infinite suggestions for critical 
independent variables, all providing some measure of explanation, but none providing a 
complete answer within one level 
On the internal level , likely candidates include the military, national technology 
and subversive groups ASEAN" nations, while being prone to allov.ing the military to 
playa large role in governing, seem to consider much more than internal matters alone 
tn each nation the mili tar:y holds a place of prestige and power, but are not allowed to be 
the final decision-makers for the nation. Virtually all the member nations have had to 
contend with serious domestic armed opposition groups, but there appears to be little 
correlation between force at:quisitions and domestic problems. And, since these nations 
have only recently developed the capabilities for limited domestic arms production, it is 
Wllikc1y that a military-industrial complex argument will hold any water 
The anns race definition I usc is one that integrates different inputs, onc which 
evolves out of the heuristic decision rules process42 at the actor level. This approach 
defines the weapon procurement process as a two ~!ep operation. The [irst step is a 
«bureaucratic-political decision to e~tablish a certain rule or goal," and the second an 
"economic deei~ion on the procurement of weapons to satisfy this rule or achieve this 
goaL,,43 This rule-making, and the satisfaction thereof, opens the door to a variety of 
influences. Action then is based on perception of the environment and the goals best 
suited for that environment. r focus primarily on the actor levcl and the events that drive 
the actor's decision-making process. As previously indicated, events do occur on the 
other levels, but I consider their effects as inputs to the actor, and not as stand-alone 
actIOn entena 
The third level concerning relational factors, willie important, also does not seem 
to be the critical factor. None of these nations is now, or at any time in the foreseeable 
future, locked in a struggle for its existence. Their relationships are bener characterized 
by friendly competition and normal distrust of one another. There are no long standing 
blood feuds around which to rally national sentiment (at least as fin as their ASEAN 
neighbors go) 
Systemic factors, the fourth level, again while important, do not seem to be the 
crit ical decision variables. The ending of the Cold War is unquestionably important, but 
is not a ccntinuous input into the system. While some nations arc stronger and more 
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powerful than others in the region, there is an accepted hierarchy of power and authority 
in the region. Possibly more importantly, the region still experiences considerable 
cxtcrnal el(ertions of power (i.e. the United States, China and Japan) which tend to 
minimize internal competitions. Since there is a minimal level ofsysttmic confrontation, 
It is diflicult to argue that this is thc deciding IevcL44 
As an alternative, James Payne in ~Nations Arm suggests an actor level 
model which he feels accurately el(plains the annament policies of most nations. In this 
model Payne tics force levels to the wcalth of a nation in attempt to define nonns and 
averages~~. He indexes military effort hy dividing the forcc ratio of a nation (the mlmber 
of full-time military personnel per thousand population) by the proportion of national 
resources that arc discretionary46 This approach would yield higher absolute force levels 
for richer countrics, but which arc lcvel whcn compared to relativc economic strength 
Thus, a richcr countr), can afford more defense than a poorer one Even more 
importantly, a nation that amasses wealth also thcn '"naillrally" grows its defense at a rate 
.. D,CIer Scngnaas , ··Systemic Coofronl3uon, Armament Competition and Armament DYIllrnic. ," in Gkdusch and 
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commensurate with its economic gro\>,th that is independent of any outside 
considerations (i.e. engaging in an arms racc). This is an approach which must be 
considcred in the ASEAN characterization due to the rapid economic growth experienced 
by all member nations. 
Payne goes on to assess the impact of other tactors such as regime type, culture, 
religion, geography, conflict involvement and domestic opposition resulting in a model 
which he feels explains all variances from his basic assertion (using 137 case studies) 
While these other factors may in fact be useful, the definitions employed to generate high 
significance levels arc fairly arbitrary and of limited usefulness in this thesis. (For 
instance, Indonesia is not listed as ha .... ing a military regime Singa(Xlre is listed as an 
island nation which, while true, because of its proximity to Malaysia -a river 
separation, should not be compared to the likes of New Zealand, Australia or the 
Philippines.) Overall Payne's analysis on a globalleve\ offcrs an interesting backdrop 
for my analysis. His effort to tie economic reSOUIces with some type of predis(Xlsition for 
warfighting adequately describes how cultural factors are linked to defense spending. 
Unfortunately, by concentrating solely on cultural factors (read historical tendencies) as 
modifiers, he ignores the (Xlssibility of new influences either in various cultures or 
entirely outside of cultural considerations (such as technological impetus to anns 
purchases). It is for this reason that I have adopted the approach outlined. 
One additional matter concerning the general nature of arms races, that is the very 
concept of a race, must be addressed. A race can be defined as a constant acceleration 
" J;unesL.Payn".~{NewYQ,l:l3ll';IBI""l'Welllnc .. 1989).46 
or, in more traditional tenns, a competition consisting oran initial accderation followed 
by a steady state progrc~sion towards the endpoint. If one u~es the constant acceleration 
definition , the question of an endpoint quickly becomes a problem Constant 
acceleration in an arms race would require ever increasing percentages ofa nation 's 
resources, ultimately eonswning the nation in the process. On the other hand, using thc 
more traditional race definition, initial gro\vth in dcfense expenditures are followed by a 
leveling ofT effect. This stabilizatIOn permits a certain constancy to develop in the arms 
race, enabling a nation 10 continue spending on defense without self-destructing in the 
process. This definition would scem to best characterize the "race" bern'een the United 
States and the Soviet Union. It would also seem most applicable to the patterns emerging 
out of ASEAl'I, While the nations arc spending considerable amounts ofmone), on 
defcnse, there have been real and relative cuts in defense cxpenditures even while 
qualitalive improvements have continued 10 he made 
Even having characterized the work "nice" itseJf, the type of "racing" i~ still a 
question. The goals of nations engaged in a race may vary from that of follow-on to 
catch-up to stay_ahead.47 Since I am dealing with a multilateral group of nations and 
., As qoottd &-om Nils Pene< Gleditsch in endnotes 19,21 «lksearch on Arrns Rares," in Gledilsch and NJc l'tad, 
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not a bilateral arrangement, I bel ieve it is reasonable to expect to find any or all of the 
three types of racing occurring. The nature of these goals for each individual nation \\,111 
necessarily detennine other details and are entirely consistent with the notion of the 
heuristic decision rules proccss 
B. FACTS AND FIGURES 
While it is not JXlssible to break out naval expenditures from overall military 
expenditures, it is !XJssible to create a comprehensive picture by using a variety of other 
touls. Undeniably there has been a huge increase in defense expenditures between 1983 
and 1993 (Table 11-1). Of interest is the huge increa<;e in spending on the part of most 
ASEAN members. This increase however is not matched by spending increases in the 
nations which are touted as regional tlueats (India, China). Most of this discrepancy is 
accounted for by the low initial spending point 
COUniry .\.{alay.i~ Philippi"" Smgaf'O'1! 
Table 11-2 Change in Military bpenditures 1983-1993 
Source: ACDA. World Mj litarY ExnendjDlrcs and Anns Transfers 1993-1994 
1. Overall spending levels are rapidly increasing. The increases represented 
in the previous table are significant when compared against regional aggregates. Over 
aggregate incn:asl: was 54.9 pc::rcl:nt By contrast, the Middle East saw an aggregate 
decrease in military expc::ndilurl:s of52.6 pcrccnt?3 
1. Purchases 
Thc nations of ASEAN have cmbarkcd on regionally significant "modernization" 
programs Specitically each nation has been moving away from purchasing 
counterinsurgency weapons and pursuing systems morc appropriate for intersulte war 
Aiding in the shift has been the glut of weapons on thc Illtemational arms market. in 
essence crcating a buyer\ market in mo~t annament categories Included in tms build-up 
has been thc purchase of tactical aircraft, maritiml: patrol aircraft, and ships 
While the following chart (Fig. n -l ) does not reveal a constant increasl: in 
numbers ofvcssds purchased, it docs indicate an upsurge in purehasl:s in the last five 
years. Ship acquisition numbers include vessels of more than tOO Ions unless thcy are 
research vessels, tugs or iccbreakers. Small patrol craft arc included only ifthcy carry 
100 nun or greater calibrc canon. Notc the sensitivity of thc graph. Single purchases 
make a large ditference in the direction of the curve. A similar sensitivity may be 
ascribed to regional security perceptiolls. While absolute numbers of platforms 
purchased may not be large, any increase in the region may havc a substantial impact 
This \\~1J be examined further during the ca.>e studies 
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Now, the above graph when taken in combination with the next one (Fig. 11-2) 
begins to illuminate the maritime emphasis ofweapolls purchases in the region . The 
trends, while not being absolute arc prl:Scnt. There has been a decline in land system 
purchases, beginning around 1980 Land systcms include armoured vehicles (tanks, tank 
destroyers, armoured cars, armoured p!;!rsonncl carriers. armoured support vehicles and 
infantry combat vehicles, but not lorries, jeeps, ctc.) Also included is artillery (multiple 
rocket launche!>, sell:propelled and towed guns, and howitzers of 100 mm calibre or 
greater). Thailand ha ~ recent ly purchased significant amounl<; or land systems, but more 
than likely thi s is thc result Chinese friendship efforts than anything else. In additIOn, it 
should not be overlooked that Thailand is the " land power" representative in Ihe casc 
studies and would be e.lI.pcetcd 10 have significant Icvels of land system purchases 

ASEAN Land System Acquisitions 197().1994 
-In<lones;. L.nd S~5tems 
_ . Sin~"por" l.ndSystelJY< 
. - Tn.~and LaM 5yslerns 
.~ 
100 ...... "" ...... __ / . ': 
O · . - ,. ' 
Fi~ure II·~ ASFAN i.and Sysl(!m Acqlti.\· IIIOI1.\· 
Overall . though , the tr~nd seems clear. There appears to be a shilt in emphasis 
away from land system acquisi tion towards ships (and ai rcraft) 
2. Quality 
Beyond simply buying more systems, each nation has also drivcn down the 
average age or the fleets_ WhIle average age is not evidence in ihclf of quality of a fleet, 
it is fai r to say that a fleet that is younger is probably more modem and more capable 
than a fleet which is significantly older For instance, each of these nations has 
experience with owning castoffs from other nations. The United States and the Soviet 
Union dominated this practice, supplying mi li tary aid in the Conn or ships that were 
twenty to thirty yean old when turned over to their second owners. Ships in Ihis category 










Current invemories indicate fleet ages that have been halvcd in some cases (Table 
11-2). In ru:ldition to the average age changes, the navies have all diversified from being 
FAC oriented. The individual navies have taken on more robust capabilities by adding 
corvettes, destroyers, submannes, and In Thailand's case, a smail aircraft carrier. This 
sort of expansion will certainly not cause any fear in the hCllrts of sailors in the Chinese 
or Japanese, hut it ",,111 cause the member nations of ASEAN to consider their neighbors 
more carefully 
C. FORCE LEVELS 
Force levels are presented here as an overview oflhe region's naval situation 
Specifics will he addressed in the case studies for the selected nations 
IndoneSia possesses the strongest naval force by a substantial margin, including 
operation of the only submarines indigenous to the region. Recent enhancement of 
Indonesia's naval capabilities including 2 Type-209 submarines, and ex-East German 
supplied 16 corvcttes, 14 LSTs and 9 MCMs49 has caused concern among the other 
members of ASEAN. Ostensibly "the vessels were to be used for anti-druglanti-piracy 




provide the basis for significant improvemcnt in Indoncsian naval capabilities, especial ly 
in force projection. 
In Indonesia's defense, it has only 73R,268 square miles (mil) ofland and 
666,100 mi. of baseline coast, bUI has 1.577,300 square nautical miles (run1) to patrol as 
its EEZ S1 To adequately patrol this enti re area by traditional wcstem standards would 
require naval forces quite in excess of what thcy currently possess or will likely ever 
develop 
Thailand's procurement ofa helicopter carrier with V/STOL aircraft capability is 
cause for genuine concern among the other ASEA.l·~ nations. The Pllblicly cited rea:;on 
for this acquisition has been the perennial Vietnamese threat, but in light of the softening 
of that threat, and gradual accepumee of Vietnam internationally this line of reasoning 
has limited credibility. The real reason, probably power projection throughout the South 
China Sea region is troubling for other nations around that region. The delivery oflhe 
carrier may also boost the navy's domestic rank where it currently is the jWlior service 
Singapore dominates maril!me commerce, hut has a tiny navy of 26 vessels (not 
including riverine patrol craft). Ultimately, Singapore is in the most tenuous jX)sition, 
being the smallest nation gt."Ograpbically, and \\lth no significant natural borders 
separating it from Malaysia, and only thirteen nm of water separating it from Indonesia. 
The impact of this drives Singapore to routinely seek regional harmony, trying to draw all 
lIS neighbors into viable, working arrangement that benefit all, but whose supreme goal is 
tne continued sW"vival of Singapore. In line \\-ilh this reasoning, Singapore has slgned a 
Memorandum of Understanding (1990) with the United States allowing a few U.s. jet 
fighters to be rotationally based at Peya Labor air defense installation and offering 
increased port aeeessS2 , an arrangement that otTers mutual benefits ",,>j th minimal costs 
Brunei is in a similar situation, being a small nation with one much larger 
neighbor-Malaysia. Unfortunately, Brunei does not have many oflhe strenj,>1hs that 
Singapore has : limited strategic interest by major powers, linle indigenous shipbuilding 
capability, and a very small merchant fleet. It may be, in fact, that Brunei isjust no\\{ 
emerging as a maritime nation in the classic sense Brunei 's best defense is a low level 
of external interest 
The Philippines arc the most troubled and have the least capable navy. Until the 
US withdrew from Subic Bay, the Philippine navy had little to worry about in tenns of 
defense against an external aggressor. The Philippine Navy as a result had many assets 
(leftovers from WWIl), but linle operational capability_ Compounding Ihe problem is a 
land/water ratio similar to Indonesia (115,600 mi2 of land and 328,345 of baseline coast 
compared to 520,700 nm2 to patroli3• The most effective ann oflhe navy WdS the 
riverine patrol section and counter-insurgency troops. In the late 19RO's, the Philippine 
navy embarked on a program of modernization, first disposing of the rotting hulks that 
were a drain on tight fiscal resources. They are still in the process of slowly reinventing 
the navy, starting small and looking up. Fortunately they apparently have the luxury of 
time 
" Hugh Smith :mdAnthoo}- Bergin.ed. ".-41 P"wqiqthchcifoc- TQ ..... rd IheYeM 2000 (Boulder: Lynnc_Rieone,. 
1993),50 
" Moms, Expon'iooofThirdWorl~.13 LTable5.6 
A hodgepodge of capabilities and pc::rceived threats for each nation emerge at first 
glancc_ The information on the non-case study nations has been includcd to tlesh out the 
regional snapshot Knowing the composition of the respective neets. it is reasonably 
clear that additional purchases, even at low levels, would disturb what balance exists in 
the region This is in fact what is occurring_ Singapore has recently signed a submarine 
training ab'Icement with an option to buy. Indonesia has ordered I>vo mon: submarines 
and is considering stepping up a rung with its surtace ships_ Thailand is building a light 




Indonesia stretches over 3000 miles and is an archipelagic nation_ The navy in 
such an environment obviously plays a significant role in both day-to-day life oftbe 
nation as well as in its defense 
By applying the three hypotheses to Indonesian military and naval developments, 
it is demonstrated thai nol all purchases can be explained for rational reasons (i_e 
economic expansion or security concerns)_ Some acquisitions and trends, in fact , are due 
to prestige factors related to status in the region. As the de facto leader of ASEAN, 
Indonesia understandably would prefer to retain that position. Some members of 
ASEAN arc making that more difficult as they purchase weapon ~ysterns that lmderminc 
Indonesia's traditional regional military superiority and pursue policies external to 
ASEAN official policy_ The result is activity which is indicative of an anus race 
B. ECONOMICS 
The Indonesian economy has incn:ased four and a halft imes over the past twenty-
five ycars_ According to the economic hypothesis there should be a corresponding 
increase in military expenditures and, all things being equal, a rough translation to 
increases in fleet size_ It is apparent from Figure lli-l that military cxpenditurcs have not 
kept pace v.ith increases in GNP_ In fact, while therc has becn an eighty percent increase 

in GNP over the past ten years , there has bl.'Cn only a five perccnt increase in military 
c)\penditurt!s 
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While this slight increase in defense expenditures is in keeping with my first hypothcsis 
(in that it is nol a decl ine), it is certainly not the sort of increasc m expenditure e)\ptttcd 
(rig. m-l). Based on this a question to be asked is whether the nllVY has received an 
increased proportion of defense resources 
it should be noted that Indonesia, as well as Singapore, has made a concerted 
effort 10 limIt lIs e.xternal expenditures on nnns by developing indigenous capabilities for 
arms production. If Indonesia has accomplished this to any extent, becoming efricient in 
production , it is reasonable to assume thaI overall acqu isi tion costs will decrease while 
simultaneously providing positive inpUllo GDP levels. The clrcet ofanns substitution 

per se is not the focus of this thesis and accordingly is not further examined ~ j It is 
mentioned here as a potential caveat to weapons import fi~'1lres. Indonesia has been able 
to produce lower end naval assets such as fast attack craft (FACs), but has yet to produce 
indigenously an~thing largcr {despite having plans to do SO),S6 
Indonesia docs not re lease (nor do any of the ASEAN nations) a breakdown of 
defense spending, Because of this, it is only possible to extrapoLate trends in defense 
spending based on force acquisition, This is accomplished using two methods. The first 
is a (;Qmparison of naval acquisit ions (ships) versus GDP. The second approach is a 
trend assessment of numbers ofplatfonns purchased according to the branch of tile 
military 
'While the purchase of ships is nut entirely consistent v-lith Ihe trend in GDP in 
Figure ill-2, it docs reflect upward movement in a general sense. One of the anomalies 
-the pcnod between 1982 and 1985 - is explained by looking at Indonesian oil 
revenue, 1982 saw a decrease in ui l revenues of 1.1 percent followed in 1983 by a 
decline of29.5 percent The negative growth in oil revenues continued through 1987,57 
As the Indonesian economy moved away from its dependence on oil and continued its 
" For further ~"",ssi"" = 11,,;$ W. Snider, "The Polillcal DunenslOns of Mil;tary Spending and Debt Service,' 
~~~jl,1IO.4 (Marchl~),278 - 30~ :and,AMonKarp,«~f;~tar)'Pr OCUf".,,,cnland 
R~gional Se<uritylJ) Southca:;tA:;i",»~.----lAiiall,,,o.4(Marchl9')())355 -6 
.. R. Supanha, ~Imloncs;a's Na\)' B"lancicg Srraleh'Y and lnlTOIipa;tKln," iu!rnLaljon~en""J!.c~i<:", 24, IlO 3 (Marcb 
1991) !~5 
'I AndrewL Rot;s, GrCMlh, '";)ebland;\lil[larySpcnd;",~ inSO\llh=IAs; .:'C;,!!!'-I"!!'(!Q!MV~ 11;00. 4 
(Marcb 1990)' 25 7_5~ 

expansion in earning foreign exchange from other sectors of thl;! economy, spending on 
defense stabililed and slowly increased again.'~ This is retlectcd in naval acquisitions in 
1983 and 1984 with zero purchases, and low numbers of purchases during Ihe nc.xt lew 
years 
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]-Iow has Ihc Indonesian navy, or TNI-AL (Tentara Nasionlll-Angkatan Laut) , 
fared comparcd to its lei low serviccs" Despite bcingj unior 10 the army and roughly 
equal to the ai r force historically , the navy recently has seen increases in its proportion of 
acqu isi t ion money. In Figure \I!-3 there is a definite decline in land systems and aircrali 
acquired While Ihi s parliall y due to an ovcmll rise in acquisi tion costs (modem 
... Robef! E. !..uonc}' "tId P C Ffcd..'f,kscn, - TI"" EwnoolO; L.Joo!cnmn,n!, a rM,I,!m), E' p"'II(!J(urcs 11\ So<-Icc!oo Ea, t "' ''rlll 
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wcaponrv is proponionally more cxpensiw), it is also true that maritime atlair~ have 
increased in visibility, and therefore, government attention 
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Overall it appear~ Ihal tht;: .:cOllomic hypothesis provides littk insight into the 
source on naval acquisitions m Indonesia. The correlation hetween econom ic growth and 
naval acqu isition i, weak MI[itary force acquisitions appear to be dri ven by factors other 
than t!ConomK growth"> [)espite this \~eak economic correlation, naval expendi tures as 
a percelllagt'! of overall defense spending appear to be increasing. Tilis occurrence L, not 
predictcd m the ~contlmic hypothesis but !l'nus i l~ e ! flo further investigation. 

C. SECURITY 
Indonesia sits astride some oflhe world's busiest sea lanes, and as an archipelagic 
nation, face s no land threat. The effect Indonesia's unique security environment has 
been a de-emphasis orlhe role uflbe anny and empha:;is uflhe roles oflbe llavy and the 
air force . The ann)" as in many developing countries, still plays an important role in the 
governing process, it is decreasing. The rest of this section wil! examine the current 
security situation and how it is impacting naval arms acquisition 
Applying the threat hypothesis (perceived threat detennines force strucrure), 10 
Indonesia yields some interesting conclUSIOns. Threat is broken down into five 
categories and is then examinoo. The five categories are: 1) extra-regional, primarily 
China and India; 2) intra-regional; 3) domestic; 4) resource acquisition ; and, 5) trade 
Breaking dov.'ll threat in tills fashion covers the strategic environment in which Indonesia 
and the other ASEAN states exist in, but also reflects the concept of resilience which 
underpins strategy throughout the region 
indonesia pioneered the concept of resilience v.ith its defense department 
statemt:nt in 1974_60 "National resilience is essentially a concept to strivt: for the 
real ization of welfare, prosperity, and the defence and security ofa nation_,,,sl This is a 
useful framework for understanding how Indonesians may perceive threat. The resilience 
';'lbi;:l9 

concept is a subset oflhe national philosophy of ASIagalra62 Rcsil ience and Aslagafra 
together crcate an atmosphere where all is in balance. In other words, one aspect can not 
b'TOW at the expense ofthc others, Ihis would be detrimental to the overall growth and 
welfare of the state63 
This concept has permcated the region evolving into regional resiliem;e 
Regional resilience acts at the regionallcvel promoting an identical philosophy The 
result has been a careful consideration of the same mantrs at a regionallevcl . General 
relationships bet\.vcen ASEA.1\' members should not be distorted due to conflicts on some 
specific 
1, Extra-regional Threat 
Indonesia has little cause to fear direct invasion of any part of the archipelago. 
Extra-regional threat is manifested in concerns over Indonesia's ability to oontrol her 
EEZ and to insure uninterrupted flow of shipping through the various international straits 
which pass through Indonesian waters It is from this perspective that China, India and 
Japan will he considered 
China 
China has emerged as the greatest external threat, but for Indonesia, the 
Chinese threat is slightly diITerent than for irs neighbors. The South China Sea issues, 
while important to Indonesia, do not carry the same degree ofsignifica.nce as they do for 
" Tbid,9 
others,M Indonesian claims do not come into conflict with the Chinesc in these areas As 
a consequence, China does not directly threaten Indonesia via thc Spratlys and Paracels 
Chinese aggression into the South China Sea however does weigh heavily 
on the minds of Indonesian planners .~~ The import of Chinese asseniveness is read in 
Jakarta as being attempts to re-establish traditional Chinese hegemony in the re!,rion.66 
Despite many Chinese diplomatic assurances to the contrary, Chinese goals are to 
establish hegemony in the region Naval programs have been organized to support this, 
among other goals.67 Competition for the title ofregionallcader is perhaps the most 
""Philip Bmuing and Adorn Scbwar>- "Liye""dUtLiye.··FarEa<temEconom~ 153,00, 28(11 July (991) 
<0 
., Amil.av Acharya. A New R.eoio.,al Order jn So rlh ·East Asia- ASEAN in 11K; PQ§J.Cold WjIf Era, Adelphi Paper no 
27~(Lor>don'lISS,Augu.'t 19')3), 35.36, Acharyastatcs ·'lndonco:ia'sfOl1l1erdcfcr.ceminislcLBenny Murdani. 
prtrlict.ed that 'any oonfmntatiooiD the Sprallyswould not l>c limited to a bilalcr,1 CllCOIIllIcr" , Theecooomicand 
.trategic importance of the Sr>rally' is a I\laj oc factoc behiod sllcb concern, In the wmi. of Ali Alata •• the 'stnll:tic 
importance of the South Chin:! s",a is ,_,beyond question_ As a semi..,oclosed sea linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
and locatoo betweencontinenul Asia and insular South--east Asia. it encompasses important sea I""",of 
communication and. indeed, the Strait.'; ofM.lace. and SiDgapore at its southern e= rank among the bllSle.<t 
"traits iD the world ' . Economically, the SpT.tlys arc bc:lie>'ed to be rich;o 0;1 arxIot!= mineuJs. such as maoganc:..: 
nodulcs, as well a. in fishinegoounds. Stratcgically.tl-cSpIlItlyfslandsan:loc.tc<illCarm.jocsea·lanesincasLern 
Asi.,. which carry about ~O%or Japan' s oiL Durine tbe Secood World War, the Spr.tl)." wen: used by the JapflllCSe 
Na.-y "" a submarine base and staging area foc ;t.'; attacks 00 Mal.y and archipelagic SOlltb·east Asia; thc Dutch hst 
l)ldiOS8ndtbePhil iprines CoolroloftheislilndgmupcouJdprO\·,<kaoounll)with'tag:ingpoil,tsforsut\'eiliance,""" 
laDe i~te:rdlction wd other naval operatioru tha1 could disrur>t tr.ffic from SiDg.port to south.rn China and Taiwan" 
.. lohn Wilseo:, Lewis and X"" l.itai,China's Strategic $eaoower The P(~iticsofforceMod<:mi~.ationintheNuclear 
AU(Stanford Stanford Uni.-=ity Press, 1994), p, 224_ SttaisoLco Yueh·Yun Liu, {;.hina a< • NlJde~Power in 
~ (New York: Tar>ling..- Publishing Coo, 1972) and Mocbw- K=ma·Atmadja, -'Some "Thoughts <J:I 
ASEAN Secunty C()..opcratioo: An lndon",ian Pcrspectiv.," Cooteruoorary SQlltlqS! Asia 12, no. 3 (o.cember 
1990): 168forrnscllSSlonoftnditionalCbinese wo.-ldyiew 
Lewis and Lit.:li wrill: that Chine", n'HI strategy has moved from ··coastal dcf= with continental bi",," il, 1950 
th"'nsh "oea·bosed C<lastal defense" in 1976 to Cl,I!Tent " integrated sea·b.a.sed oucl.",dete="",'"_ The nllClear aspect 
issomewhatimJX1ft31UlOlodonesiansecurity,blJtitistheassociato:iconyenliooaioavaibuild·upwithexpandcd 
com'entional reach th.t is most worris."l!l1e to In<io!wsian pllUlncrs 
·' Y""setr Bodaosk)'."n..:People·sKepublicofChinaOnccAgamSccksMi~tary Qpti-oru;,"~ 
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" In the late-19S0s, 1M PRe N."y began crossing the "lin~" {''the Fin;t Line of Islands" stretchi ng f.()I'Il the Aleutian 
1.lands, 10 Clusltima, toJapan', rnail, isla"ds, to Ok.inaw", to Taiw,"", the Phil ippines .. and the Sunda Islands) with 
gJ"C3ter for",,_ With the evaclJation of both Cam Ranh B.y and the Subic Ray (by 1M So"icts and the LiS ""pecti>'ely), 
Ikijioganticipatcd _ str~tegic "a<:uum inthc region ar<! conurutted itself to filling it "' 
"Beijmg considers its 10u~·lilnc elisPll1" ,,;th the ROC, Vi .. 1nam, Mal~si il. and the Phi lippil.es o,er tl-c Spradv Islands 
"" .. test in WhIch i~1 I>e~moruc posluU ,,,Jibe coo..,lidated and '"""gruzed by the more revon " 
significant issue for Indonesia,68 Underlying this is the deeply ingrained mistmst of 
Chinese fcll by the majority of the Indonesian population (the non-Chinese segment) 
which, until recently, was periodically fanned by the Indonesian government69 Indonesia 
recognizes the size of China, but does not eower in its presence 
Finally, Chinese involvement in both Myanmar and Thailand has fueled 
concern over Chinese intentions, Jakarta perceives anns sales and military assistance 
from China to Thai land as opening a "strategic ..... indow" to Southeast Asia which should 
not have been opened'o China, thus, concerns Indonesian officials on a variety of fronts 
11. India 
On the western side, concern has b'fown over India's naval expansion, 
exemplified by the establishment ofa base at Port Blair in the Andoman Islands_ This 
facility is approximately one hundred mi les from Indonesian territory and sits astride 
northern approaches to the Straits ofMaiacca,11 Indian expansion at Port Blair directly 
threatens Indonesian security interests since Indonesia has declared itself an archipelagic 
nation, and dedarcd its maritime straits as part of its national security (trying to eounter-
balance Chinese moves into Thailand and Myarunar). While India may have clear 
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strategic reasoning for installing this facility, lack of interaction with its ASEAN 
neighbors ha~ raised much concern about Indian intcntions72 
Indonesia has recently engagcd in bilateral and multilateral exerciscs with 
thc Indian navy in anempts to defuse any misperception. Also, by building closer links 
with India, Indonesia improves its regional position vis a vis China. While these 
activities demonstrate a certain degree of good wi!] between the two nations, lndonesia 
continues to be wary of Indian inltntions 
.Japan 
Excluding the United States, thc Japancse navy is the only navy capable of 
establishing a presence in the region Its complement of submarines, 'Aegis' destroyers, 
and traditional maritime orientation provide Japan with the whcrewithal to become a 
military force in Southeast Asia. ASEAN mcmbers view Japanese restraints as simply 
political (Japan's constitution and security arrangement .. " .. ith the United States) and arc 
subject to revision at any time. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alata~> "The !,'Teatest 
threat to regional balance would be if, for example, Japan said it was abrogating thc US-
Japan Treaty and changing its peace constitution so as to become a power unto itsclf."n 
Indonesia is primarily concerned with the possibility ofan upset of the regional balance 
"O",gory Copley, '<lne";t~ble India, In.''itabk Power." Defense'rx1 FqT~i", Affai" (December 1988) 6 
S.:calsoJ. Socdj.tiDji ..... ando.K\'"MultilateraJActiviue<inSOUthEastA<;aAIllnclooc'ianPcrspective,"(Papcr 
presented at 1995 Pacifie Symposium, Honoiulu. Hawoii, 22-23 february 1(95).2 1.22 
" l\5 qootc<.lfrom FEERin AchaJya 
due to Japanese military activity. Tlu:re an: some minimal concerns ahout a rejuvenated 
Japanese military mar(;hing down the road of conquest again 74 
Japan has not alv.~dys heen very reassuring either "Prime Minister Fukuda 
noted at a September 1981 Japan-ASEAN meeting that Japan had the capability to 
become a military superpJwer next to the U.S. and U.S.SR. ,,"/) IndOii.esia has no desire 
to see Japan emerge as the preeminent power in the region. Japan ' s military forces are 
huilt around a technological base which is superior to that of Indonesia (or China fo r that 
matter). In other words, forces that would be adequate to deter Chinese aggression into 
Southeast Asia may not be adequate to deH:r possible Japanese aggression. Current 
arrangements, while not entirely satisfactory offer the comfort of resembling the status 
quo and offering some predictability for the future A repositioning of Japan in the 
regional balance could open the region to more than economic competition 
Overall, China is the biggest threat followed by India and Japan. There is little 
douht what little support Tndonesia gives for a continued American regional presence is 
primarily grounded on a perceived need to deter China 
"Franklin B. Weinstein, " J.panand S""thusr ASIa,n Room A S~al.pinoandlusufWon~OOi, ed,.~.Politica!, 
and Security Is~ucs In Southeasl A,,, in1!K..l.2ffi> (Berke!ey: Institt)leofEasl Asian Sludie', 198'.), p. 188 
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Chin.,KorC<l, JIIdthe l!SS.R-; (1) it would increase politicai tens,ons v<;th !be Soviet linion, and (3 ) it ..... ould htlve a 
dcSl.abilinng effect ir. Southeasl As," and would arou:sc ASEAN 'llspleions _=' eJJpanesc motivations. A 
pani<:ul~r\y troubling Guestion foo the lndouesian., concerned the maRt:[ in wbJci! Japan rrughl (!crille its dc{ense 
p"rimcter in the future - -",he!he, b«:am;.t of its dependence oo:lCCt:ss to raw malffi.ls;md oil. that perimeter might 
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2. Intra-Regional Threat 
Indonesia is the most populous country and has the best equipped military in the 
region, and as such is not threatened by anyone of its neighbors. Howcver, the Fivc 
Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) worries Indonesia. Originally constructed as a 
deterrent against further Indonesian aggression (additional Konfrontasi) in the Southeast 
Asian region in 1971, its members arc Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, Britain and New 
Zealand,76 Malaysia's initial conccrns were to keep Great Britain involved in the region 
as a hedge against a resurgence oflndonesian nationalist policies. 
Recently, activity on the part of the FPDA has been on the increase, with larger, 
more comprehensive exercises being held each year. Coupled with the possible addition 
of another ASEAN member, Brunei, has Indonesia worried about an alliance that is 
grov.,ing both in size and performance - an alliance that is directed at lndonesia, 77 
Indonesia has made numerous statements advocating the building ofa purely internal 
alliance, a three power pact consisting of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.78 
Specifically, Indonesia would like to restructure defense arrangements in J\SEAN around 
three country core consisting of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This three country 
grouping would supplant the FPDA, ultimately ensuring that Indonesia maintains its 
preeminent position in the region. Such a move would effectively include Brunei 
"President Sukamo tried to prevent In<lor'..sia from "stablishing states 00 Bomco, speeifically 1M states of S.b:th and 
SMaw.k A mitiW',' campaign la\lIlCMd against Malaysia.".as llIlSucussful. Koofron'~s; refers to the gen..-..J 
lndonesian policyofappl~1ngP'""<s=onMalaysi" in ." ,hale"<T=pos,ihle and "'as in placcfrom tht;mid_1950s 
to the IIlld-l%Os 
" SanjivPrabsh, O<ASEANAcquiresl'e"' Trtt h, Nev.Wonis,'·~~~~ 
(No>-ern.t.:r. 199(l); 13 
"Mochtar, ·'Some ll>oughb< 00 ASEAN StturityCo-~ation.·· 161 -1 71.oo. ~ . ProfessorMochtarisaformer 
lndon<:sianForeignMinisrer 
because of its close relations with Singapore and essentially isolak Thai land. Movement 
in this direction would accomplish two goals: a three-power pact would mi nimize a 
perceive<! threat as well as solidifying Indonesia's preeminent position in the region. 
3. Domestic Threat 
Despite a lack of organized intemallhfl;~at, the Indonesian military (ABRI), 
including the nary, is introspectively oriented. This is most obviously portrayed in the 
poliey ofDwi Fungsi or "Dual Roles of the Anned Forces" A manifestation of 
ASlOgalra, this policy requ.ires the military to playa social as well as militaJ)' role In this 
conte:d the nary executcs the Operasi Bakti, or Operation Devotion policy where the 
navy provides social support services to inhabitants of remote plaees. 79 It is unlikely that 
this internal social function of the nary will change any time in the foreseeable future 
Internally Indonesia has had few domestic problems other than East Timor since 
1966 when the Commtmist Party was el iminated as a political force in Indonesia. The 
mass killings and witch-hunts proved to be exccllent deterrenec for any other would be 
commtmists. This ruthless approach, facilitated by a military coup in September 1965, 
coupled with excellent economic gro\','th through the 1970s and 1980s has prevented any 
resurgence of the communist party.80 This leaves the regime v.ith basically h"o other 
domestic problcIns - East Timor and fundamentalist Muslims 
"'Suparth.J_ ~ )ndon es;a- < Na"yBalaocUlgS1TJ!cgyandlnp-o"pec!!on" 193,11<). 3 
"t Scbwarz.~_19-48 
East Timor has proven to be an extreme embarrassment for and constant drain on 
the Indonesian government However, the insurgency in East Timor has exhibited little 
propensity for spreading beyond the island of Timor. Muslim fundamentalists feel 
somewhat betrayed by President Suharto who had indicated an inclination to move 
Indonesia towards becoming an Islamic, vice secular, state. Having not movcd in this 
direction, Suharto has effectively alienated the fundamentalists. Suharto has been able 
to prevent the fundamentalists from gaining political power by effectively marginalizing 
their appeal. He has manipulated the hannony concept and moved between competing 
political interests nimbly enough to kcep the vast majority of the population relatively 
pleased, and thus away from any "revisionist" groupS.SI Domestic unrest, while a 
concern, is not of critical importance (as it has been in the Philippines and Thailand, for 
example). There has been no significant pattern of peaks and valleys in domestic unrest 
requiring changes in defcnse allocation for domestic purposes 
4. Resource Acquisition Threat 
The passage of and recent ratiGcation of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) redefines the maritime environment for coastal states. The 
creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) out to 200 run has greatly expanded the 
amount of territory a coastal navy is responsible for 82 Indonesia has extensive offshore 
oil facilities which it needs to protect, as well as whatever seabed resources may be found 
"SchWML~~,2g-4g 
"Dav"! Miller. '<OlfshorePau-olhllg: Now ROsp<llls,b,liu.,5 DernandSpt:Ciaheo:l Eyuipmen(." ~ 
~28,lI<l_ J(JaoUilI.,.I995 ) ;40 
in its EEZ.S] Fisheries are another obvious resource which needs to be protected. With 
the overlapping maritime claims in Southeast Asia, and the proximity of the stales, 
fishery patrol is a vital issue for Indonesia 
Since the 1982 conference, Indonesia has ordered or taken delivery oft\venty-five 
frigates and eorvenes, ships large and capable enough to effe(;tively patrol Indonesia's 
EEZ. Between 1970 and 1982, Indonesia had purchased a total of eight warships oflhe 
same class (and none larger). While EEl patrol considerations are not tbe only concern 
for Indonesian naval planners, the timing of the purchases over the last twenty-five years 
and the quantities purchased seem to indicate that UNCLOS had a significant impact on 
acquisition decisions 
5. [rade Threat 
As previously indicated in Chapter I, huge amoUlll~ of trade flow through the geo-
strategic chokepoints which arc Indonesian internal waters. The flow of trade through 
these straits providcs additional husiness for Indonesia ranging from shjp fepair to 
provisioning. Tn recent years, a surge in piracy has threatened to impact the volwne of 
trade moving through these scalanes.s4 By improving contacts with the Royal Singapore 
Navy (RSN),lndonesian naval officials hope to put a halt to the piracy prohlem 
"~l"rk J. V~lcoci~ . "ThirJ Wotld cooperauon on Pacific marine !IllOOral r~s," Thjul Wocld D ig nerl.- 8, jl{). 2 
[Apti: (986),596-600 
"Dominic Nalh.all, «DIrect hnks to. Singa>"",~, In<i<XICS,,,n oavics," I~a;l> Ti"",~, 2.~ June 1992, p. I 
A report (>n!he prob~m,j""l released by !he Lnile<l Kingdom-boscd lnlcrnallonal MaritIme lIureau, had ,dentified the 
walaS mncbmf, from the 1IO!\f""u lip ofSumalfJ through the Mal""", on<! Singapore Sluits_ Pbilltp" Channel and 
Ocyood as !he smg~-mosl dan1!CfOOlS ~trelch of ",ali" inl.cm~ "()nal l)- TiJcn, were 0>-.'" 200 alucb lhcr-c lasl year, 
C<'>lt'l'arffilo60l:l199IJ.tnd1ru-""they-earl>cfore'> 
Recent naval purchases seem to be partially motivatcd by cxtra-regional threat 
concerns. In addition, these purchases follow on the heels of significant acquisitions by 
othcr regional states. Whethcr this is perceived as in increased threat or a status 
challenge will be addressed in thc next section. Purchases have also been affected by 
expanded maritime responsibilities The size o[most vessels purchased indicate this as 
being the primary factor 
D. PRESTIGE 
The prestige hypothesis posits that acquisitions are made in response to 
acquisitions by neighbors for non-security reasons. Indonesia, not being threatened by 
anyone of its neighbors, appears to be making some of its purchases based on prestige 
factors. The FPDA, despite being originally organized as protection against Indonesia, 
exhibits little appearance ofbcing offensively oriented or capable in any way. As the 
senior regional power, Indonesia has a certain position to maintain, one where it retains 
capabilities superior to its neighbors 
Singapore's recent annOlmcement of its submarine program drew an immediate 
response from Indonesia~5 Indonesia has recently announced its intentions to purchase 
at least two additional Type 209 submarines, and possibly as many as [our more. This 
follows a Singaporean announcement of intentions to purchase a submarine. The 
purchase of a single submarine hy Singapore can not threaten l!1donesia's enlin'~ 
"FBlS_EAS_95.J&6,RaouluBlond. '·Na,ytobuyU>MSubmarin.oF"'mSwedtll,"~£i.24s.,plember 
l\l95. p. 3 
submarine force. The timing of the announcement though, indicates a decision 
motivakd by prestige 
Thailand also has apparently threatened Indonesia's preeminent regional position 
over the last decade or so. Thailand purchased two corvettes in 1983, representing a 
significant upgrade in Thai naval capabilities. Indonesia responded in 1984 and 1986 by 
purchasing a total of seven frigates, a dramatic improvement in Indonesia naval 
capability. Sf, Perhaps more telling is the Thai order of a light aircraft carrier in 1992 
Subsequently, Indonesia pmehased a total of thirty-nine ships, including sixteen corvettes 
from Germany. While there are certainly other factors which complicate this analysis 
(including the huyers' market argumt:nt posited by several amhors) the timing of the 
purchases merits attention as an indicator of prestige concerns playing a role 
[have not considered the timing of purchases ofFACs here because they do not 
carry any "symbolic thrO\\' weight" Naval system acquisitions outlined above all possess 
some degree of'\ymholic throw weight' and thus arc clements or the prestige argument 
E. CONCLUSION 
Naval acquisitions appear to be driven by security and prestige factors more so 
than economic reasons. The lack of correlation between economic grov.th and force size 
strongly indicates that other factors are affecting amJament purchases being made 
Naval forces, seemingly, are getting a larger ponion of defense department outlays A 
renewed emphasis on the maritime environment to Indonesia has spurred this growth 
., Acqu;s;tion, a.l ,~poncd in Dates Gil!, J.N. Mal: and Si~mon Wezernon, ASEAN Arms Acqui,;t;Qns 
.!kvo;lQ£i!l~(KuaJaLur:ll'u r: Maiaysia" institute()fMaritimeAffairs. I995) 
Recognition ofEEZs has been the primary motivation behind the purchase of most ofthc 
smaller surface ships. The scaling back of the superpowcrs' military has not only 
enabled regional actors, such as Lndonesia, to take responsibility for their ovm security, it 
has forced them to 
The rcgiotllil 'pecking order" is also important to Indonesia. Having assumed the 
position of the regional heavy, it is imperative for Indonesia to equip forces to sustain 
that position. Indonesia has purchased additional naval a~sets to preclude the possibility 
of one of its lesser neighbors being able to claim superiority in any fashion in the 
waterways around ASEAN 
IV. SINGAPORE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Singapore is a nation of only 227 square miles with a population of2.5 million 
separated from Malaysia by a very narrow strip ofwatcr87 Additionally Singapore is 
populated by ethnic Chinese, with Malays being in the minority (the reverse of the ethnic 
wmposition of both Indonesia and Malaysia- Singapore's two much larger neighbors) 
Singapore's geo~stralcgic vulnerability is well recognized and has driven the shaping of 
the Singapore Anned Forces (SAF). Modeled after the Israeli example, Singapore 
defense strateb'Y emphasizes fast-rcactmg, quick-deploying, heavily armed forces 
Singapore foreign policy emphasizes multilateralism and economic activity as the 
hasis ofan overall security strategy. Acknowledging the limits of their military potential 
and their uniquely vulnerable geographic situation, the govemment has sought to engage 
extra-regional powers, t:specially the United states in ordt:r to (;ft:att: and maintain 
regional stability 
B. ECONOMICS 
The grOV.1h ofthe Singaporean economy has been more dramatic than Indonesia's The 
economy has increased over sevenfold in the past twenty-five years. Again, the 
economic hypothesis predicts growth m ffillitary expenditures ""hell the national 
economy experiences growth. During the ten year period between 1983 and 1993 GNP 
'" Ro\Jer1 0 Tilman, SW~hea>tl\.sia and the Enemy Beyond, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 28 
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doubled, and military exp!nditures al so doubled (Fig. IV-I). Unlike the previous 
Indonesian example, Smgapore strongly follows thc expectations of the economic 
hypothesis Defense spending has increased in lock-step fashion with growth in the 
economy 
Has there been any shift in expenditures emphasizing naval acquisitions? Again, 
the data is sparse and unclear. Figur~ IV-2 indicates spotty grow1h for the Royal 
Singapore Navy (RSN ). What Figure IV-2 docs not reflect is that Singapore has 
modernized and upgraded the systems it owns, to a greater extent than any other ASEAN 
Virtually all it major platfonns, even down 10 the missile gun boats (MOBS - Lurssen 
45s) have undergone extensive modifications , Singapore has added eh::ctronie warfare 

and satellite communications capabilities to vessels which are normally viewed as being 
simple coastal defense craft. Nine oftwelvc major system upgmdes over the past 
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twenty-live years have been for e1emcnts Oflhc RSN. This would indicate that despite 
limited purchases of new vessels. the navy h~ managed to si gnitlcantly upgrade its 
capahilitjcs ~ ' 
Singapore has developed the most extensi ve indigenous capllbilities to produce 
armaments. Recently this capability was exemplified in the production ofthn:c Swedish 
" BG(NS) Lee Hsien Loong. Deputy Prim" Mini:; ter at 'aun~b i n g; of RSS Fc~rlc~" III Fd) Il'arr 1995 
statcrl 

licensed mine counter-measure vessels (MCMs). Singapore is producing small naval 
combatants for export 
While there has 110t been a significant upswing m numbers of naval purchases as 
compared to overall defense purchases for the Singar Llrc Armed forces (SAP) there has 
been a decline in ~cquisitions for the other seviees over the paSI fifteen years. Thi s trend, 
combir.!d with the operational and admmistrative (basing) e;o;pansions of the RSN over 
the past few years seems 10 indicate a growing role for the RSN as compared 10 its sister 
scrv ices(Fig.IV-) . There is a limit to the RSN's b'Towth By vIrtue of possessing a very 
small geographic area as its home, the armed forces have, by necessity, developed a 
greater degree of jOlntness is present in any of the armed forces of the other ASEAN 
members. Air assets conducting maritime patrol, which in other natIons arc assigned to 
the navy, in Singapore arc actually part of the Air Force and not part 
Trends in Singapore Military Acquisitions 
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of the RSN. The fact that Singapore has recently purchased four Fokker 50 En/orcfl" 2 
aircraft for the ASWlMaritime Patrol mission, (having only one previously) is an 
important shift in resoUJces. In addition, these purchases equal the total numher of 
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C - E-2Cs) Singapore possesses 
Overall, Singapore has not only increased its defcnse expenditures (they are 
pegged at six perccnt of GOP), but resources are also being shifted from other areas to 
the maritime environment 
C. SECURITY 
Because Singapore is a small nation, (sometimes rcfcrred to as a city-state), it has 
se{;urity concerns which are vastly different than those of Thailand and Indonesia. The 
la{;k orland Singapore can afford to lose in any conflict has driven Singapore to follow 
Israeli defense examples As a result, Si ngapore approachcs defense much differently 
than its neighbors. Singapore is fearful of any onc nation becoming too powerful in the 
rcgion For this reason, Singapore has aggressively pursued continucd American 
engagement in the region.89 While disagreeing with many U.S. policies, the official 
Singapore position is that continued U.S. presence forestalls Japanese military expansion 
and therefore precludes any subsequent reactionary activity by other east Asian countries 
such as either Korea and China.90 
,. Roben Kamiol, 'The IDW Inlerview,' Jane 's Defe~ 16. no. 19 (November 9, 199 1):920 
'Xl Franklin D Weinstein. "'Japan and Southeast Asia," Robert A. Scalapino and JllsufWanandi . cds 
llfonomic Political and Security Issue, in Southe,J:,1 i\.";a in the 1980:> (Berkeley InstituleofEast Asian 
Studies, 1982), p. 188 
1. Extra-regional threat 
China 
China docs not directly threaten the geographic security interests of 
Singapore. However, Chinese aggression and the resulting tunnoil in the South China 
Sea is a critical threat to trade in the region. It is at this level that Singapore is most 
worried about the People's Republic of China (PRC). There is some low level concern 
about Chinese aggression beyond the South China Sea, but this is not reflected in 
national security planning beyond attempts to keep the United States involved in the 
region. 91 
Singapore views Chinese issues through a triangular lens. The official 
position revolves around a belief that China will be the superpower of the future . This 
belief is founded simply on the population size, economic potential and nuclear 
capabilities of China Restraint of the Chinese will be possible only if the United States 
and Japan (the other two elements of the Asia-Pacific security triangle) continue to 
cooperate. A breakdown of the Japanese and United States relationship would severely 
impact the concept ofregional security in the region.91 Inevitably, the resultant 
9\ Singapore is involved in only one formal alliance. the Five Power Defence Arrangement. All other 
a~~~t~ ar:u~a~:.,~~~~~a~~;t~~fn':~ch at National Day Dinner, 12 August 1995 stated 
"But China is different. It may be backward; it may be poor, but it spotenlial is enormous. tt is already a 
nuclear power. \.Vha!ev~r economic advance the Chine<e in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao have achieved. 
tbe Chincse in china can and will achieve likewise. [t is only a matter of time, Indeed ev.,n whatttJ" 
Japanese have don~. he mainland Chinese may be able to do in three or four generations bul eventually the 
Crun.,se must firsl re-order their societies and educate their 1,2oom Chinese 10 each person's maximum 
potential as the Japanese have done with their 120m Japanes.. But when they do, China may become the 
number one power on the Westem side of the Pacific, unless Afn.<,rica has a good partner in Japan to balance 
China. And that Japan win have to be treated asa partner not as faithful follower Although this may not 
happen for many years, the expectation of this possible development has contri buted to tensions" 
Speech coun""y of the Singapore Government via the Internet 
(http ./Iwww.gov.sglgovemmentlspeecheslsmspeech.html) 
redefini tion of security in the region would lead to a Japanese military build-up, in tum 
causing other regional actors to respond v..lth their own defensive huild-ups. 
b. Japan 
Singapore recognizes that Japan is a key player In Southeast Asian 
security issues. The World War Two expenenee still colors perceptions of Japanese 
motivations and intentions. Until Japan is forthright in recanting the infl uences that 
drove the militarism leading to World War Two, all of Southeast Asia will continue to be 
very nervous about any expansion of Japanese military operations. i\long these same 
lines, an opening of Japanese society, making it more transparent and accessible will 
greatly enhance perceptions of peaceful intent ions throughout East Asia."} In addition, a 
widely h.e\d belief in Singapore holds that the United States must remai n an aeti\le player 
in Japanese security in order to keep a lid on regional fears of Japan. American security 
guarantees are viewed as being a positive constraint on possible Japanese militarism. 
Japanese business interests , being spread throughout the region, are also 
perceived as restrict ing any future Japanese expansionist tendencies. In fact, it is these 
widespread business interests, and the Japanese need for the SLOCs staying open thai 
fear of the Japanese in a military sense is minimized.94 Nonetheless, Japan\ march 
through Southeast Asia fifty years ago, and the perceived lack of remorse insures that 
Singapore will continue to cast a wary eye towards Japan 
"'Ibid. 4 
Natural rcsourccs however art: a difft:rcnt question, separatt: from business 
mtert:sts. As was indicated in the previous chapter, the qut:stion of how Japan draws its 
security perimeter is of utmost interest. Raw materials are available and arc being 
bought, not taken, by the Japancsc. For reasons of economics, technology and racc it is 
appropriate that Singapore be more fearful of Japan than China. China still has a long 
road to travel and needs Singapore as an cconomic engine to help it.95 Japan, however, 
does not 
2. Intra-Regional Threat 
Intra-regionally, Singaporc, in a scn~t:, is caught between the hammer (Indonesia) 
and the anvil (Malaysia). Singapore perceives itselfas being in a relatively precarious 
position with respect to its two mueh lar~;er ncighbors. Despite occurring thirty years 
ago, the Indonesian policy of Konfrontasi with Malaysia taught or maybe reminded 
Singapore that despite extra-regional threats, intra-regional states can also pose very large 
threats 
Singapore and Malaysia are both quite adamant in continuing the FPDA (Five 
Power Defenct: Arrangement), and evcn increasing its scope of operational exercises 
While threat in the FPDA is defined as any external nation attacking (or threakning) 
Singapore or Malaysia, the list of possible aggressors certainly includes Indonesia 
Indeed, the foonation of the alliance occurrcdjust a few years aftcr Indonesian 
aggression against Malaysia, and as Great Britain was drawing down its presence in tht: 
region. This timing indicates that considcrations of an Indonesian threat played a vel)' 
large part in the furmation of the alliancc. The other major threat llildoubtedly spurring 
the fonnation of the alliance, that of Vietnam, has disappeared, leaving extra-regional 
threats such as China to lill in as perceived potcntial aggressors. Singapore has not 
reacted fa\'orably to Indonesian proposals scmbbing FPDA and insti tuting a trilateral 
arrangement instead (indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia) 
It is also interesting to note that Singapore did not recognize the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) until 1990. Why was this the case? Singapore felt it could not 
recognize the PRC illltil after its ncighbor, indonesia, did."" This clearly illustrates the 
regional power situation from the Singaporean perspective. Obviously the government of 
Singapore felt it \\ow; more important 10 not offend its neighbor than it was to atTend the 
most populous nation in the world. It seems unlikely that Singapore was not under any 
prcssurc from the PRC to establish relations, yet they refused to. Clearly Indonesia is 
feared more than China hy Singapore. whcthcr or not this is officially admitted 
On the other hand, Malaysia is also perceived as posing a threat to Singapore 
The SAF are in large part designed to be able tu defeat any potential Malaysian attack 
While Singapore maintains 45,000 people active in the anny, the nation has a reserve 
pool of250,OOO to cal! upon in time of emergency Since it is unlikely that any other 
natiun has the ability to insert significant forces into Singapore other than Ihe United 
States, that leaves only Malaysia as the cause for maintaining such a large reserve force 
Singapore and Malaysia have had their rough spots. One perennial point of 
contention is the dispute over an island (Pedra Branca) off the coast of Johor 
% Leo Suryandina!a. "lndonesia_ChinaRdation,: ~ 30. no . 7 (July 1990), p. 68) 
Occasionally actions taken by the two nations cause high level military alerts. but none of 
these have blossomcd into active hostilities yet.97 
Singapore continues to cultivate a variety of multi lateral military contacts, 
refusing to place its security in the hands of one defense organi7.ation or to rely to heavily 
on one country 
3. Domestic Threat 
Domestically, Singapore faces the fewest problems Despite a multi-rdCial 
population (Chinese and Malays) the differing cultures co-exist very well (unlike 
Indonesia). Singapore also lacks a significant Muslim community as a viahle political 
movement 
4. Resource Acquisition Threat 
UNCLOS lIT has not had a dramatic impact on Singapore Development of an 
EEZ is virtually irrelevant due to Singapore's geographic situation. Singapore is lucky to 
claim a full twelve nautical miles as territorial sea at any point in the waters surrounding 
Singapore. The close confines of the Singapore Straits preclude any possibility of claims 
beyond those of a territorial sea. 
As a result , Singapore has no need to patrol significant fisheries, oil fields , etc 
Singapore's main concern for EEZIterritorial sea responsibilities arise from the need to 
assure safety in the straits thcmselves . 
• 7 Amitav Acharya, A New RegiQnal Order in South-East Asia ASEAN in t il<: p,,,1.Cold War ETa_ 
Adelphi Paper no. 279 (London nss, August 1993), 30 31 
5. Trade Tbreat 
"Unlike othcr countries in thc region, SingaJXln: docs not have wide areas of 
territorial seas or exclusive economic zones to patrol or defend. We therefore do not 
need a large mlVy. But we still need to defend SingaJXlre from seaward threat~. This is a 
key mission of the RSN (Republic of Singapore Nary). At the same time, we depend 
critically on free and unimpeded acccss to sea lines of communications. Most of our 
tradc ,,\ith the res t of the world flows through these sea lines. So do vital supplies like 
food and fuel Thc RSN has to safeguard these sea lines of communications, and be 
ready to kcep them open during any crisis. ,,98 
Singaporc takes piracy quite seriously - a thrcat which evcntually could cut into 
the Singaporean economy. The Phill ips Channel is by far and away the most dangcrous 
area in the world for mari time commerce. Continued degradation ofmaritimc safety has 
the potential to cut commerce throughout the region - dramatically impacting 
Singapore's economy. "Thc SLOC's are particularly imJXlrtant to us becausc our trade, 
most of which is seaborne, is (valued at) three time our gross national produc\."'f'J 
J"he threat posed by piracy has been strong enough to push Singapore into closer 
ties with Indonesia to combat piracy and smuggling. 100 Here again this reemphasizes the 
point about Singaporean fear of Indonesia. These ties being mentioned are of the most 
., BG(NS) ~ Hsien Looug. 18 February l<)<)~ 
99 RokrtKarniol, "The JDW imerview.'" no, 0. I" 
lOa Dominic Nathan, "Direct Links for Singapore, Indonesian Kavies" The Straits Times. 25 June 1?92. p 
1. S""ais". "Joint t>-:aval E:<~rcjseBetween Singapore and Indooo,iaBegi~s,"~, l S 
O\:lober 1994, p 23 
rudimentary sort, the ability to communicate hetween naval vessels, etc. and not 
extensive combined operations between the two nations 
D. PRESTIGE 
Singapore easily has the most technologically advanced military forces overall 
For Singapore, prestige affects arms acquisitions in a slightly different manner than it 
docs in Indonesia. Whereas Singapore is not the regional strongest military actor, it docs 
arguably possess the most effective and efficient forces 
Singapore, more SO than its neighbors, has established itself as a commerce and 
technology center. A nation which purports to be technological advanced must have 
military forces which convey this national self-image. 101 Dr. Lan Teik Soon, vice-
chairman of the Govemmell! Parlianlentary Committee for Defence and Foreign Affairs 
stated: "The navy should be given more ships if it is required to defend our waterway:; 
and act as a deterrent. Apart from playing a role in Singapore's defense, the navy and the 
rest oflhe SAF have to keep up with technological changes in order to contribute to 
regional security"~Ol This remark by a government official indicates the role technology 
plays in the nation of Singapore. It must also be noted that part of the technological push 
in the SAF is due to a declining recruitment base. The SAF are trying to compensate for 
smaller numbers with more technology. While this fact must be taken into consideration, 
it does not negate the role that prestige plays in the acquisition of new technology for the 
lOL Darn Eyre ami Mark Su~hm~ "SlatU5. Norms alit! the Prohleration ofConventiona/ Weapon~ An 
Institulional Theory Approac~ ~ in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed ., Culture and National Seeuril>' (New Yorlc 
Columbia Univer~ity Press, in press), Chapter 3, p. 16-17 
'01 Sanjay Perera, ··Singapore may buy subs ifn~et!, says Dr. Lau,' T~~ 11 December 
1994, ;;ection Horne, p 30 
SAF Installation ofsate!1ite communications on missile gun boats certainly secms to fit 
in the catcgory of decisions that wcre made due to prestigc factors 
F.. CONCL(JSION 
Singapore's naval acquisitions are explained by all three hypotheses_ The 
eC(lnomic hypothesis has been borne out through increased military expenditures overa!! 
(consistent with GDP growth) and a shifting of resources to the maritime environment. It 
is apparent that Singapore is also adjusting 10 a new threat environment. Smgapore has 
gone on record trying to maintain an American presence (especially naval) in the region 
The purchase of the mine \varfare craft and the be,gilUlings of a submarine program also 
demonstrate a shift in threat perceptions followed by adjustments in force structure. 
Finally, Singapore has been purchasing weapon systems in keeping with Its position as 
being the most technologically advanced in the region Prestige reasons vimmlly require 




Thailand is included in the country case studies because it is the mnSlland-
oriented member of ASEAN, excluding Vietnam. Significant changes in the Thai 
defense structure, especially those indicating a greater emphasis on maritime issues, 
validates the argument that there has been a regional shift to maritime security_ fn 
addition, the engagcmo::nt ofa land power in a significant naval build-up adds greater 
\vcight to the contention that a naval arms race is occurring 
B. ECONOMICS 
The Thai economy has experienced explosive growth. over the last ten years, as 
have those of its ASI:--:AN neighbors_ Between 1983 and 1993 GNP more than doubled, 
increasing from $53.9 billion to SI22 billion (Fig. V-I). Based on constant 1993 U.S 
dollars, th is is 127 percent growth. However, overall mi litary expenditures during the 
same period increased only 7 1 percent bascd on constant J993 U.S. dollars. Whik this is 
]]01 as great a military expenditurc expansion correlation obser\lcd as that observed 
Singapore, it is significamly more than Indonesia's increase in military spending 
Unlike the previous tv.ro case studies, there is enough information to create a 
snapshot of defense budget distributions with respect to Royal Thai Navy (RTN ) funding. 
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These numbers Crable V-I), as compiled from the Far Eastern Economic Review and 
IISS Military Balance indicate that the RTN budget has grown at a rate exceeding overall 
defense spending growth. In fact, between 1986 and 1993 the RTN budget has more than 
doubled, while overall defense outlays have nearly doubled. Additionally, these numbers 
do not reflect the RTN's entire budget for example, an extra 3.5 billion baht has been 
set aside for the purchase of aircraft for Thailand's new carrier. lO' Tbesl: numbers 
indicate a definite shift in priorities toward the maritime environment 
For thc sake of comparison, the other approaches used in previous chapkrs 
(GOP/ship acquisition comparison and overall trends in military acquisitions) will again 
be employed in this case 
Fable V-I RTN Budget Compared 10 Owrnll Thai Defense OUl{ay~ 
Sources FEER, 21 October 1993, p .. 'O_31 and !ISS Military Bal;mce 1987-1988, 1993_1 994 
The ship acquisition versus GDP comparison indicates activity similar to that 
witnessed in the previous two cases (Fig. V-2). While there is not an absolute trend 
upwards in the numbers ofplatfonns purchased, there does appear to be an upward trl:nd 
in the post-1986 period as eomparl:d to prevIOus years. Since it is the stated goal of the 
RTN to bui ld to a two ocl:an navy, these increases are expected. 11)4 Supplementing the 
enhancd combat capability is the improved logistic support to go with it. The RfN has 
ordered a 22,000 IOn replenishment tanker from China. !Os This purchase alone 
[03 Rooney Tasker, " Sil~m Service: Navy reaps rewards of slocring dear ofpoli{ics:· far EaSlem EC<lnQrnjc 
~2jOctohcrl~93,p 30-31 
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Overall trends in military acquisition indicate movement av.'aY from land 
concerns and possibly towards marit ime threats. The land force build-up in the late 
1980's was primarily due to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampucnea in 1978-'11<\ In order 
to prevont any further aggression by Vietnam and to combat other border problems, as 
With Laos, Thailand greatly enhanced its land tOrces. As the Kampuchean problem 

started to settle down and sort itself oul there has been a dramatic drop-otT in acquisitions 
supporting land warfare (Fig V-3) 
The economic hypothesis does appear to have some weight in Thailand's case. 
Thailand's mili tary expenditures have exp..1nded significantly as the economy has grown 
Despite a continued land threat. maritime expenditures havc si gnificantly increased 
Trends in Thailand Military Acquisitions 
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Figure V-7 Trends In thoi Military AcqlllsillOn.l". f970-199.t . 
In large part th is is due to policy positions wh ich havc evolved from Ihat of a front-line 
31alC in Ihe war against eommuni~m to a slate attempting to enhance its commercial 
position. Accordingly, the Thai government IS trying to encourage development oflhe 
Indochina region as a new economic unit with Thailand opcrallnt; as its hub. 107 In 
, Q'! Sirikrai, "Thai l'erceptions Qf China ami Japan: 259.00 J 

essence, Thailand may be trying to recrt:ate ASEAN on tht: continent. This greater 
emphasis on commt:rce requires a concomitant emphasis on maritime matters in order to 
protect" growth in trade 
C. SECURITY 
As previously mentioned, Thailand 's security concerns are significantly diffcrent 
from those of Singapore and Indonesia. Land threats continut: to be the number one 
concern for thc Thai military. Thailand's borders with four other nations, are 
significantly longcr than any other in .!\SEAN, in fact at least an ordcr of magnitude 
longer than any of the others with the exception of Vietnam. This fact combined with 
historical animosities and ovalo t:s will insurc that land concerns ""ill remain preeminent 
for a long time_ However, as the Defence of Thailand 1994 white parer makes clear, 
other threat~ are quickly gaining in importance, Tht:se threats include: sea boundaries, 
conflicting claims on territory (both land and sea), competition for maritime resources, 
pollution and the environment and infectious diseases_IDS 
The perceived drawdown of the US. military presence in the region has seriously 
impacted Thai security considerations. I i}q The security arrangements made hy Thailand 
with the unitcd States after World War n seemed to guarantce a largc role for the Uni ted 
States in Thai ddense. The espousal or the Nixon doctrine, the U.S. pullout from 
Vicmam and the reduction of American military aid in the 1970s and early 1980s all 
clearly illustrated to Thai policy makers that the US could no longer be counkd on for 
'"' r-.1irl'sny o[Defellce, ~rlce ofThail~, (Bangkok, Ru ng Silp f>rinting Co., Ltd., 1')94). 16 
J09 Tas ker, "SilcntService," :> 1, 

security assistance at a level that Thais desin:d. I IQ The more recent drawdovifll and 
drawback of US military forces has left a perct:ption ofa power vacuum in Thailand,lll 
1. Extra-regional tbreat 
Between Thai perception of the threat environment and the strength of Thailand's 
land forccs, the Royal Thai Amled Forces (RT AF), Thais do not fear much in the way of 
extra-regional aggression. In addition, Thailand has demonstrated a skillful ability to 
playa balancing game, historically keeping potential aggressors at bay, I II 
China 
Unlike most of its ASEAN neighbors, Thailand has a reasonably close 
working relationship with the Chinese. III 'j 'hailand moved to wann relations with the 
PRC after the United States pulled out o[Yieillam and demonstrated its unreliability as 
an ally in Indoehina. 114 Cultivating this relatIOnship has yielded some military benefits, 
110 Kerdpohl, '"Thailand and the Security ofSootho:a.,-, Asia,"J.i1~  5, 110. J (Summer-Fall 1990) 
"9 
'" FHlS-EAS-95-190, "N~w S~curity Policy Should Jnclude U S ,"~, 2 October 1995, P ,; 
lE1 David Van Praagh, "Democracy and Asian Seemit)'," Glob~ 8, TIl) \ (Winter \993) 81-82 
' ''RobertO Tilmal~ So"theast Asia and ttJ" Enemyllcyond' ASEANPC!cepl~~ 
(Boulder Westview Press, 19K7), 119 Tilman stales "Some ofthe most important leaders in every 
ASEAN state harbor lung_range t"ar, of a pow~rful China. But Thailand, at one end of the spectrum, is 
willing 10 acc~pl China as an ally so long as present conditions demand it; Indonesia, at the oth~r extreme 
v;~ws th~ PRC a.~ a shorl-rangc as well as a long-range threat to the security of the region. For Thailand 
the PRC i~ a tiger in the jungle; fu, lndone~ia th~ PRe tiger is lurkillg menacingly at the doorstep 
Between these two extrcmcs lie the rcmaining three ASEAN partners Malaysia is dosest to mdonesia, 
Singapore, to Thailand; and the Philippines, allhe middle of th~ s;=trum " 
including the purchase of significant amounts of military hardware at "friendship 
prices".1 15 
China has recently been quite enthusiastic in developing closer ties with 
Thailand, both politically and militarily. J 16 In pan, this is due to a current lack of conflict 
between the two in the South China Sea. Thailand is one of two nations in ASEAN 
whicb does not have conflicting claims with China over tbe Spratlys or Paracels. This 
does not mean that Thailand is not concerned about Chinese regional intentions 
Thailand does rely on the South China Sea for fish and does have EEZ claims in the 
region which may bt: the basis for any future Sino-Thai conflicts. 1 i7 Past aggressive 
Chinese actions in the region worry Thai defense planners because of the effects that a 
conflict in the region might have. There is a reali7..ation that any military action could 
quickly grow out of control and involve extra-regional powers such as the United States 
and Japan. ll & China' s naval expansion is also acknowledged, but apparently is not 
dwelled upon. 119 Thai decision makers recall China's history as a hegemonic power and 
do not discount it; but simply do not let it drive their decision-making. no 
])! Sirikrai. "Thai Perceptions of China and Japan," 255, no . 3. "The acquisition of Chinese heavy 
armamenlS started only in 1986 when China donated thirty-six 130 mm guns 10 Thailand. In January 
1987, General Chaovalit decided \0 buy a wide range of Chinese arms at "friendship prices", that is. at 
only to peocent of the market price," A later order included the 4 Jianghu class frigates currently in the 
RTN and a third order included diesel submarines (never delivered) 
116 Sirihai, "Thai Perceptions of China and Japan." 254, n". 3 
I" Kerdpohl, "Thailand and the Security of Southea,t Asia,» 126. 00. 3 
'''Ibid,,127 
m Ministry of Defence, T~-,< ~~!l!U..221, 10. The white paper states "China has emphasized 
blue water capabilities. and by utilizing joint operations, it has improved its abi~IY \0 project military 
power rapidly"' but does not expound any funher 
"" fBIS-EAS-95 -190, "New SecurilyPolicy Should Include U.S," p, 4 
b. India 
India's movement into the Andaman islands has caused some concern for 
Thailand as it does for indonesia. The white paper statement on India declares that "The 
Indian navy is powerful and is the only one in the region that can compare to the Chinese 
Navy With two aircraft carriers and hases on the Andaman and Nieobar Islands, India IS 
a very potent maritime power in the region ,,1'-1 However, Port Blair is physically closer 
to Indonesia than it is to Thailand and poses a greater threat to Indonesian commerce 
than it does to Thai commerce 
The potential for conflict with India remains Official statements indicate 
tbat a second helicopter carrier is being considered. This ship wouLd be purchased for 
the express purpose of conducting patrols in the Andaman Sea which would increase the 
potential for clashes between India and Thailand.122 RTN forces currently are based in 
the GulfofThailand with only a small contingent being assigned to tbe Tltird Fleet along 
Thailand 's west coast 113 As the RTN !,'TOWS and becomcs more active in the AndamaD 
Sea, the potential for conflict \\ith India \\ill grow 
Japan 
Thai perceptions of a possible Japanesc threat differ significantly from its 
ncighbors The variance is probably due to the vastly World War II experience 
Thailand was not occupied by conquering Japanese forces. 114 In fact, lbailand has 
]~] Mini.sl,yofD~fenc ~, !hcl:!rlen«:ofThailand 199410· 11 
" 'Taskcr."Sikm S"Nic<\"30, 
]1J Kamiol, The RTN's twO-ocean ambition." [7, no. 22 
,.,. Sirikrai> "Thai P~[cepli(]ns(]fCrunaandJapan» 260, no. 3 
escaped any of the colonizing experiences that the other nations in Southeast Asia have 
endured_ Unlike most ASEAN leaders, Thai leaders see some benefits in a Japancse 
military build-up, that such a build-up would actually enhance peace and stability in the 
region. 12) 
The greatest concern with Japan resides in the economic realm and not 
specifically in the security domain. The overwhelming power of the Japanesc economy 
has had both positivc and negative effects on the Thai economy. The development oflhe 
Thai economy to its present level now requires changes in economic relations with Japan 
in order to progress further. Slow movement in tIns area has caused some resentment 
and ill-will, but does not appear to be spilling over into security eonsiderations_ 12 6 
2. Intra-Regional Threat 
Intra-regionally Thailand has little to fear. Its main focus and enemy over thc past 
twenty.five years, Vietnam, has stepped back from its earlier aggressive policies_ The 
declinc of the overt Vietnamese threat as well as thc removal of Soviet influence has had 
a calming influence on the region_ The situation in Kampuchea, while far from heing 
stable, is at least quiet, and is exhibiting signs of developing some long-term stability. 
See also Tilman, Southeast Asia and the Encmy~, 110-11 
n' Sirikrai, 'Thai Perceptions of China and Japan," 260, 110_ 3 
Later Sirikrai writes " It is al.o noteworthy that leading Thai elite' in various quarters also support the idea 
of increasing Japan's political and security role in Soutllcasl Asia in place of America's decreasing role 
because of its economic status_ A5 Japan nO longer abides by its pre;;O\Js 1 p"r cent GNP defence· 
spending principle and continues 10 increase its defence budget, it is likely to become a mil itary power in 
thc nearfuturc, perhaps by the year 2020, if not sooner. However, Thailand and ASEAN will feel safe if 
Japan's defence posture continues 10 be under the conteXl ofJapan·U.S. security arrangements' 
'''Ibid _, 261 
The various bordcr conflicts and contested territory claims which Thai land is a 
party to have also acquired an element of tranquillity. Some of these disputes are being 
handled and solved diplomatically. as in one case with MalaysIa, willIe others have 
simply experienced cessations in armed eonfliet. 1l7 
Militarily no uther ASEAN nation rivals Thailand in armament with the possible 
exception oflndonesia Based on numbers and types of weaponry, Indonesia's navy and 
air force are prohably better than Thailand's, but Thailand's anny is most likely better 
than Indonesia 's . As a result, neIther pose any real threat to each other at the present 
time. Ifinventory balances should shift around, though, this assessment would most 
likely change 
3. Domestic Threat 
Once again Thailand is unique in ASEAN in the sense of having an essentially 
homogenous population. There is an area along the Malay-Thai border wIth a significant 
Malay population, but this is a local characteristic and has never caused widespread 
problems for the Thai government 118 
The CommWlist Pany of Tbailand (CPT) was a significant force in Thailand for 
many years. The CPT however disappeared as a political and guerrilla force whcn 
Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. The Vietnamese invasion spurred a rapprochement 
between Thailand alld China. The development of closer tics China lIot only provided 
Thailand with a new arms supplier, but in addition Thailand was able to parlay Chinese 
'2' "Hord~ring OTI boundary-decisions," Jane's Defence Wr.eleJy, ') S~plcmbcr J99~. 44 
". Tilman, So"lh~4hl Asia and the EIl.l:!:IDI-!}0'Qlli!., J 57 
fears of Vietnamese aggression into halting Chinese support of the CPT Chim:sc 
elimination of financ ial and logistic ~upport for the CPT effectively ended the communist 
party in Thailand. 129 The demise of the CPT in the 1980s marked the disappearance of 
the last major internal threat to the Thai govcnunent. It wa:; at this same time (the late 
1980s) that the military began to reorient itself away from an internal security mission 
and began to focus on external threats. no 
4. Resource Acquisition Tbreat 
Due to population pressures, fish harvests in the South China Sea are already 
important for Thailand, as well as all of ASEAN, and will soon become critical. 131 
Obviously any interference with Thailand's ability to draw ba:;ic foodstuffs from the 
ocean presents a very real and important threat Additionally, oil and gas resOluce 
estimates that range in value from 1.1 to 11 .0 trillion U,S. dollars are certainly large 
enough for nations to fight over. 132 
,,., Sirikrai, "'Thai PercepiiollS of China and Japan," 252, rIO , 3 
n" Kamiol, "The RTN's m'o-ocean ambition," 17, no, 22 
131 Kerdpohl, "Thailand and the Security of Southeast Asia," 126, no. 3. Further Kerdpohl states "Because 
of the shortage of vegetable protein and the lack of available livestock, fish forms an ind i,pensahle source 
of animal protein for the inhahitants of Southea~t Asia. About 70 percent ofthe animal protein consumed 
in the region is derived from local fish harvests. To maintain necessary nutrit ional levels for their 
populations, the nations of the region make recourse to the fish protein available in the surrounding 
waters. The increasing tendency for nations in the area to lay claim to overlapping maritime territories 
and competitive "exc!u,ive ecollomics 'lones" creates serious tensions.n "It is estimated that fish harvest 
",ill have to increase at annual rate of bet we eo 4.2 and 5 percent to maintain the minimal nutritional 
standards necessary for public health in Southeast Asia. Tha! could very easily lead to conflict in the 
effort to protoct fishing rights ., 
132 Mark 1. Valencia, "Third World cooperation onPacitic marine mineral resources," ~ 
Qu~ 8, no. 2 (April 1986) 596--97. Later (p. 601-2) Valencia oomments that Thailand is Ille country 
(ofthosc around the South China Sea) best prepared to explore lor natural resources. '"Ofthesc countries 
only Thailand might be considered to have ad(".quatc capabilities for the ocean reo;earch necessary to lay 
the fuundat ion foroftshore petroleum and mineral exploration " 
Thailand is engaged in at least two major EEZ definition contlicts. One \\1th 
Malaysia over an area in the southwestern Gulf of Thailand, has been partially resolved 
hy an agreement establishing ajoint authority for the exploitation of seabed resources 
On the othcr hand, Thailand still disputes ovym:rship of a large portlOll of the eastern Gulf 
with Kampuchea and Vietnam. Both of these areas are shallow water regions (less than 
200 meters) and thus are easily exploited,!';) Ownership (and the ability to prove it 
militarily) of these regions is clearly an important issue, onc which Thailand is clearly 
helping itselfwith by purchasing the hdicop\l;:r carrier 
5. Trade Threat 
Thailand is not as dcpendent upon tmde as is Singapore, hut trade is stiLI 
important to the Thai economy. Sixty percent of the Thai GDP is attributahle to foreign 
trade, a far cry' from the thrcc to one ratio observed in Singapore. 13• That sixty percent 
provides the hard currency which Thailand has used to build infrastructure and to 
modernize its military 
Th.ere is a conscious effort being made to expand naval capabilities which is due, 
at least in part, to govermnent attempts to increase trade. Specifically. enhancement of 
capabilities of WIN's third fleet is designed to backstop the development ofa second 
trade and supply route, a route which passes through the Andaman Sea. This in turn is 
tied directly to the "Southern Seaboard" development project designed to build a 
commercial pon at Krabi (on the west coast) and its associated industrial infrastructure 
lJl lbid ,, 613 
0), Kerdp()hl, 'hailand and !he SecUlily OfSoulheaS! Asia,' 123, no. 3 
While this is not the only reason for expansion in the Andaman Sea, it provides excellent, 
(ostensibly) non-threatening justification 
D. PRESTIGE 
The economic and threat considerations outlined do account for the majority of 
fhai naval expansion, but not all. Thailand has made some purchases based on prestige 
factors and not based on the aforementioned factors . 135 For instance, the argumcnt that 
the helicopter carrier being huilt is primarily intended for search and rescue missions is 
weak. IY, It is especially lacking when considering the fact that the purchase of this 
carrier introduces a capability to the region wruch was heretofore nonexistent. Couple 
this with a pending deal for AV-SB llarriers and a reasonable strike capability emerges, 
again unprecedented in the region by its members.m 
The graph above (Fig. V-4) aptly illustrates the push for modernization in the 
RTN Throughout the 1970s Thailand maintained a fleet which was predominantly 
second-hand, generally excess American vesscls- many dating back to World War n . 
In the 1980s this trend changed as lbailand began to shed many of these vessels and 
purchase new vessels. The purchase of new vessels had two effects. First, simply by 
adding newer platfonns Thailand was modernizing and ultimately increasing its combat 
effectiveness. This, however, could have been accomplished by purchasing younger cast-
'" Stcphen T. Ryan, "The Year in Review," Asian Defen~e Journal (January 1994): II. Ryan writes, "In 
shun,therefore. ThailanJ has garnereJ for itself a potentially fonnidable seabome aircraft capability, one 
that elevates;t to the big powcr league in temlS of prestige and represents a serious cahUefJge to other 
naval forces" 
.,6 Tasker. "Silent Scrvice,"30 
Il' Ryall .. "The Year in Rcview:' 11 
oils from the United States Oy purchasing new vessels though, Thailand was implicitly 
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The deciSIOn to go with new ve~~els vicc used (which were stili being bought hy some 
members of ASEAN) indicates a dcsire 011 th t: part of Thailand to be seen as a regional 
military power a "CUI above the rest " 
Therc is some evidence in Thailand that not only national prestige but also 
service and personal prestige factors are at work. Accordi ng to Amilav Acharya, "In 
I'haiiamJ, decis ion regarding weapon acqui si tions frequently rcflect a service ehiers 
desire to be remembercd for having introduced a sophisticatcd wcapon sys tCll1 " I )~ 
11 ' Am,tav Ac~al'ya ·'E~pla in i!l!:! the Arms Build-up ;11 Sou:hea,t A,ia." ~f"~~.Jouma l (January 
1993) 6 8 

Finally, prestige motivations enter the calculus for Thai and Tndonesian ambitions 
for being the regionalleadeL For Thai land this means it must proceed significantly past 
Indonesia in capability in order to usurp that position 
Overall, prestige plays a very real role in the anns acquisition process in 
r hailand. The eountry has been known to lIet independently, separate in policy from 
their ASEAN brethren_14o Apparent Thai willingness to upset the status quo and actively 
pursue national interests in conflict with stated regional intcrests help create an 
environment mVltlllg an anns race 
E. CONCLUSION 
Improvement in the Thai economy has enabled the .RTAF to modernize and 
increase the combat effectivcness of their forces In additio n, there has been a noticeable 
reorientation of military spendmg away from land concerns and towards the maritimc 
environmcnt. The economic hypothesis has been substantiated in this case 
/\ changing security environment has abo led to new cmphasis on naval issues 
Dccreased American presence in the region has caused Thai military planners to 
cndeavor 10 fill a perceived power vacuum. Tncreased weight on the importancc of tradc 
and its positive economic impact has focused attent ion on the need to protect it. A 
realization of Thailand's maritime vulnerability in protecting its maritime assets, as 
defined by UNCLOS III has also contributed to naval growth_ Finally, the minimization 

of domestic security threats has freed the RTAF to focus on extemalthreats, the fist line 
of defense being in Ihe waters surrounding Thailand 
Lastly, prestige has significantly influenced the acquisition process. Thailand has 
added naval capabilities previously unrealized in the region. By doing so the RTN has 




A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
A naval anus race is occurring among all of the members of ASEAN f he causes 
of this anns race aTe varied, but can be distilled to three general categories: increased 
economic n:sources, changed threat perceptions, and prestige concerns. These three 
factors combine differently in each of the three nations to provide the impetus for an 
arms race. The anns race is not necessari ly dangerous though. This point ""ill be further 
developed later in this chapter 
1. Economics 
lndom:sia, Thailand, and SingaJXlrc all have economies which have experienced 
explosive grov.th in the past two decades. This has created an I;:nvironmcnt in which 
increased defense expenditures were possible, without 5acrificing other government 
programs_ Singapore has most closely followed the expectations of the economic 
hypothesis in its grov.th in defense spending. Singapore's defense spending has 
increased in tandem with growth in the economy 
Indonesian defense authorizations have not increased at the same rate as the 
national ewnomy, In fact, the defense budget has remained \eyel oyer the past decade 
despite a near doubling of the gross national product 
Spending on the Thai military has increased with grov.ing GNP. Even though the 
correlation in the Thai case is not as strong as in thc SingajXlre casc, therc is a definite 
upward trend in defcnsc spending This increase is consistent with expectations from the 
cconomic hypothesis 
2. Perceived Tbreat 
While changes in threat perception are much more difficult to capturc than 
increases in defense spending, the threat hypothesis has been confirmed in the three case 
studies. In each case, as the definition of security has evolved, so did threat perceptions 
which has driven changes in force structure 
Archipelagic nations, by definition, are oriented towards the maritime 
environment. What has changed for Indonesia has been how the navy ful fills its role in 
the state's security. Dwi Fungsi requires the navy to playa supporting role in domestic 
programs, not unsurprising for an archipelagic nation. Despite this continued demand for 
naval setvices internal to the state, force structure is reflecting a greater external focus 
The rise of the Chinese, Japanese and Indian navies all jXlse potential problems 
for the Indonesian navy. Indonesia's neighbors have also increased their navies as thc 
maritime environment takcs on greatcr importance. Once the sole owner of submarines 
in ASEAN, Indonesia will be one of three in the next year, and quite jXlssibIy one of four 
in the next ft;:w years. A significant perceived advantage possessed in the past by the 
Indonesian navy in maritime conflict is on the verge of evaporating as submarines 
prolifcrate in thc region. A combination of two factors has spurred thc Indonesians to 
reenter the submarine market first is the very real threat that other navies can no",,' pose 
to Indonesia by virtue of being submarine ov.'fIers. The second, and perhaps more 
important factor, is the simultaneous loss of prestige for Indonesia inherent in the 
purchase of submarines by other members of J\SEAN 
Singapore, rather than cuncentrating on purchasing a host of new naval platforms, 
has radically increased the capabilitics of existing platforms and added new types of 
naval assets. The new acquisitions and upgrades for the Royal Singapore Navy (RSN) 
indicate a desire on the part of the RSN to control potential conflicts in the surrounding 
seas, and more importantly, to deter them from occurring. As Singapore has redefined its 
security from pure territorial integrity to include economic security (encompassing the 
SLOes), the Singapore Armed forces (S M) has redefined threat Threat to Singapore 
now covers instability in the region, including conflict in the South China Sea, and not 
just the traditional concern about aggression on the part of lndonesia and Malaysia. 
Internal unrest and border conflicts are now less important to Thailand' s security. 
Thailand, a<; v.ith the others, has redefined its security on a partly economic basis. This 
new definition of security has changed the threat priority. No longer are the Vietnamese 
a force to defended against, they arc now a commercial enterprise to become engaged 
""ith. Stability and continued access to resources in the Gulf of Thailand and South 
China Sea arc more Important than the efforts of the Communist Party of Thailand 
Promotion of trade and the opening of new routes to conduct trade along are attaining 
new prominence in Thai security strategy_ The summation of these changes has resulted 
in a growing emphasis on (and expanded rak for) the Royal Thai Navy 
3. Prestige 
Indonesia has recently discerned an erosion of its position as regional leader. 
This erosion has been manifested in the kaps in capabilities oflndonesia ' s neighbors 
during a period of virtual stagnation for Indonesian naval forces . Until the early 1990so 
the modernization and capability building in naval forces that had occurred had done so 
primarily on the margins. The purcha<;c of thirty-nine vessels from Gennany signaled the 
end of complacency on the part of the Indonesians. The enhancement of neighbor' s 
naval capabilities has forced Indonesia to continue to expand its naval forces, such as 
buying additional submarines and adding to its naval air assets 
Singapore does not competc \\ith its neighbors in tenns of quantity, but docs so in 
tenns of quality. The SAF are measured in teons of how technologically advanced they 
are over their regional counterparts. The situation is similar 10 the American-Soviet 
situation during the Cold War. The Soviets were acknowkdged as having greater 
numbers in equipment, hut the Americans were general ly recognized as having both 
better quality equipment and equipment of grcater technological sophistication. For 
iIL"tance, while Singapore may not be able to support the acquisition ofa helicopter 
carrier, it does have organic air assets which on a unit level analysis are more than a 
match for its regional competitors. 
Having mentioned helicopter carriers, trus is the most prestige-laden acquisition 
in ASEAN in the past decade. As mentioned, upon receipt of the carrier, Thailand will 
be introducing a capability to the region that had not existed previously 
4. Summary 
It is difficult to argue that one hypothesis carries more weight than the other two 
in explaining tbe development ofthc arms racc. Al l three are necessary, but none are 
sufficient Clearly, all three nations have experienced phenomenal economic gro\\1h 
over the past two decades. However each government explicitly states that economic 
concerns arc as important in national security as are pure military threats. The 
implication oflhese statements is that lmlike some other developing COlUltriCS, hudget 
allocation will be done in accordance with a long lerm view. That long term view 
requires military expenses to be kept in check while the nation develops inframueture, 
educatcs its people, etc. 141 The military can and will not be allowed to expand OUI of 
controL This is all reflectcd in the twin conccpts of national and regional resilience 
Perce ived threat, plainly, has driven the acquisition process. As a power vaeuwn 
was believed to be developing, new weapons were purchased, and excess force structure 
was jettisoned to make room for new capabilities. A simultaneous paring and 
modcrnizing of forces look place. As both extra- and intra-regional threats have evolved 
and in some cases increased individual members have felt the need to acquire systems 
v.ith longer range and greater sophistication. Redefining securily in economic tcrms has 
also pushed thc govcrnmenL~ to purchasc weapons that can protect and promote national 
interests. Due to the maritime character ofthc region, this particular manifestation has a 
peculiarly Mahanian appearance to it 
Prestige and competition for regional influence is the third factor which has had 
an effect. Systems have been purchased as symbols of national technical prowess and 
modcrn abilities Soml>: systems have bIo:cn purchased in fulfillment ofself .. image. 
believed to be both necessary and the right tool for the Job, as well as being in keeping 
with the security needs orthe nation 
Which of these factors is most important? Without the first, economic gro"'th, 
the other two would not be able to have any effect. The eoonomic engine has opened the 
door of progress and modernization in each of these countries. As this has occurred, both 
real and perceived threats have changoo, and regional status has also changed In this 
respect, the economic factor is most important 
Changes in perceived threat have naturally impacted the allocation of defl>:DSe 
money. Movement towards an external orientation and away from domestic roles has 
causoo the militaries to spend more money on "big-ticket" itcms -- systems capable of 
engaging external foes. The interactive nature ofanns acquisitions, especially in a 
contlict prone region such as Southcast Asia, is nearly cause in itself to initiate and 
sustain an arms racc. However, in this case I believe a racc could have been avoided if 
not for the prestige factor 
Prestige considerations alone can not begin the chain reaction of an anns race, it 
can only act as a catalyst on developing trends. Here, prestige oonsidl>:rations have 
int1ucnced specific weapon acquisition choices, in essence crcating a status competition. 
Overall economic growth provides the gross input which the other two factors act 
upon, creating an anus race environment Threat perceptions shape the economic input 
yielding an OUlput wroch elearly indicates a need for modernization and guild-up. Tltis 
output is further modified by preshge influences wllich color the percelVed security 
needs. The final result is a naval arms race, albeit a comparatively low cost and slow 
moving competll!on 
B. Arms Race 
ASEAt"l is experiencing a naval anus race Purchases have been consistent with 
an initial acceleration followed by a steady state in acquisitions_ Naval spending is not 
declining in absolute or relative numbers. In all three nations, naval expenditures are 
increasing in both relative and absolute terms 
The pattern of acquisitions as well as comments made by government officials in 
ASEAN reveal a desire to remain competitive militarily with their neighbors. This is 
driven both by real security concerns, and also by prestige_ The prestige element is the 
factor which I find to be the final determinant ofthc characterization of acquisition 
programs in ASEAN. Without the prestige factor, the naval acquisitions can be 
attributed 10 real security needs and having a new-found ability to pay for self-defense. 
Injection of prestige however dilutes pure security calculus and causes nations to buy 
weapon systems based on what others have, not simply in response to a perceived 
security threat. 
The cycle that can emerge from this forces the nations to start buying the latest 
and greatest systems they can afford in order to be able proclaim ov.llership, the 
phenomenon of keeping up with the Jones's 
Is the arms race dangerous') Not necessarily. To date the ASEAN members have 
not threatencd each other with their modem inventories. All the nations appear to 
recognize the need to cooperate and to keep intra-regional strife to a minimum . This, 
howevcr, could change ratht:r quickly in the act: of incrcascd competition for dwindling 
maritime resources. Specifically, as their ]Xlpulations grow and fish harvests decline, 
keener competition will emerge in the maritime environment. It is in this scenario where 
it is easy to envisage Thailand deploying her helicopter carrier in such a fashion that 
would prevent harassment of her fishennen in contested waters. It is this same scenario 
that would force another nation, like Inondesia, to position a submarine in such a fashion 
that the Thai carrier is threatt:ned. What would happen in the ensuing standoff is 
anybody's guess, but it aptly demonstrates the very real possibility of con1lict between 
ASEAN members. In this context the arms race would be very dt:stabilizing 
C. CBMslCSBMs 
Is ASEA.:"1 ultimately doomed to explode in a regional conflagration') That is 
unclear. Many authors point out that the ASEAN arrangement and its organizational 
spin-offs such as the ASEAN Rcgional Forum (ARF) and the Post-Ministerial 
Conference (PMC) provide the groundwork for establishing trust and resolving conflict. 
Others rcspond with the criticism that tht:sc approaches are informal and untested, that 
most likely these will fail in the event of a crisis These authors point to the fact Ihat 
ASEAN has no region-wide security arrangement, and, that all prevIOus attempts to 
create one have failed miserably_ The first group respond with remarks outlining the 
facts that the previous attempts have all been in a Western format, in some way based on 
the unique NATO experience, and that what is needed is a new, Asian approach 
Most experts who do believe that some sort ofetfective Southeast Asian security 
regime is possible believe that a new. informal model may provide the answers In some 
senses, Westem culture is more confronlative and Asian culture more consensual 
ileeause of this fundamental difference, multilateralism, as wdified in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), may not be possible_l 42 Bilateral approaches currently 
ofter greater promise for regional officials. It is interesting to note that the less formal 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements do not sit well with most Western govenunent, 
mostly for the cultural reasons 
Vihat are the possibilities for confidencc building measures (Cll"'-I) or confidence 
and security building measures (CSBM) in Southeast Asia?14) 
Any serious attempts to create CSBMs must take into account a variety of 
complex issues_ Frequent references are made to the European efforts as being a role 
model to follow_ These comparisons arc injudiciously made. TIle European security 
,., Dr Buveer Singh, "Confidence Buildin~ Security Measures and Security Regimes in Southeast Asia,» 
AfiianD~(},1archl992)7 
"3 Ralph A. Cossa, "Confidern;~ and Security Bui lding Measur~~: AJ-~ They Appropnalc for Al;ia,~ (paper 
pre,;ented at the Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, IJawaii Jan:Jary 1995). Cossa define.CSBMs on page six 
as '"illduding bOlh formal and informal mea,ur~s, W~her unilateral, bilateral or multiialeral, Ihal address, 
prev~nl, or resolve lUlc~r:a i"lic s amollg Stales, including both mjJitary and polilical eI~mem," I U&e this 
d~fmjtion. and funher, I lump CI:IM under CSBM for the purposes of this disrus~i<>n 
situation in the aftermath of the second World War is radical!y different from the current 
arrangement in Southeast Asia. Prcsently the threat is ill-ddined, complex competing 
intercsts arc at work and there is no single bencfieent hegemon playing an active role. A 
better comparison would be today' s security situation of Europe and that of Southeast 
Asia. Herein lay useful parallels. It is also the point at which Westerners can no longer 
give advice hased on solid, successful experience. The inability or NATO or the CSCE 
(Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe) to generate satisfactory answers to a 
whole host of problems indicates the lack ofa security mechanism equipped to handle 
today's problems. The security environment in Southeast Asia is comparable to that 
whieh the E uropean one scems to be headi ng towards 
Thc roadblocks to building an effective regimc arc numcrous First, any useful 
measure must include China, and therefore must not look like a potential alliance against 
China now, or ever. 144 This problem was recently reemphasized in the failed ASEAN-
PRC South China Sea discussions. Attempts hy ASEA..,"l to bring the Spratly issue up as 
a group were not well-received by the PRe. The PRe, however, did indicate a 
willingness to discuss the matter on a bilateral basis only, 
Secondly, the approach must somehow handle conflicting maritime claims and 
offer paths to resolution (nigh impossible) or some interim accommodation process (still, 
in some cases nearly impossible). These conflicting claims both intra- and extra-
rcgioill\l\y offer the greatest source of potential conflict for not only ASEAN, but for all 
ofEa~t Asia 
,-<4 Cossa. 'Confidence and Security Building Measure •. ' p :> 
Thirdly, the role the United States will play in the region must be addressed. It is 
unlikely that America will cede interests in the region to other aL10rs without JXJsitive 
guarantees of regional stability. Th!;:re is some indication that th!;: United States might be 
willing to decrease its regional pr!;:sence ifJapan increa.~es its own presence without 
upsetting he current stability throughout East Asia 
l'e,,1, security itselfmllst be considered. Each ASEAN nation defines it 
differently despite a growmg common emphasis on maritime matters. For instance 
Malaysia considers maritime issues to be of critical importance, Singapore focuses all 
forward defense, Thailand on a land threat and Indonesia on defence in depth. l~j Such 
varied strategic concepts of what constitutes a security concern and how to address it 
makes any association "vide consensus on a variety ofCSBMs very difficult 
Finally, intra-regional suspicion and competition pose considerable roadblocks 
For instance, Singapore is unlikely 10 forgo purchasing weapon systems because of its 
extreme security vulnerability. This is not to say that SingaJXJre is prone to developing or 
acquiring a weapon of mass destruction. A regional commitment to keeping nuclear 
weapons out has gathered a momentum or its own making it extremely difficult for any 
regional nation 10 violate the commitment's intent 14(> 
,., Amitav Acharya, A~onal Older in South_Fast Asia ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era 
Adelphi Paper no. 279 (London USS, August 1993),73 
]"'lhi, has b~en codified in two v.'lly'_ Th~ Zone of Peace, F,eedom and Nelllra!ity (ZOPFA."f) of 1974 
wa, an attempt to keep members from siding too closely with d(her of the superpowers. In additioa, it 
scrvcd as a vocal deterrent to intra-regiona! conflict 
The second codification is in (he pending SouthEast Asia Nuclca! Wcapon,-Free Zone (SEAN\\-'FZ) 
This i~ a Southeast A5ian corollary to SI':NFZ (South Pacifi~ Nuclear }r~e Zone) and i. intended to s~rve 
both as a CSBM in the region and a, a control on extra-regional power. actions in the region 

On thc positi ve side, a "spider-web" of bilateral and trilateral reJutionships has 
cmcrged. I H Recently, military exchange programs on a bilateral level have begun to 
multiply (Table VI· I ). [ndonesia and Singapore have created the ability work with each 
other on piracy and air control issues In addition, Singapore has been using a 
bombing range on Sumatra (Indonesia) for training its pilots, a move necessitated by the 
closure of American bases in the Philippines such as Crow Valley 
Bilateral exercises have grown in numbers and complexity between members of 
ASEAN, especially Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (Fig VI· I ). However. naval 
12 
Frequency of Bilateral Excercises Between 
Indonesai, Malaysia, and Singapore 1971-1990 
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1087 1089 
Year 
I'Iglire V/·/ Hila/era/ Exercises 
SOI,re.. : Asian Defence Journa l. March 1<)92. p. 10 
1. ' Acharya. A New Rer;Qoal Ordn. 69 
1<0 fBlS.EAS.')S.185. "A Higher L.evel or Ties ' The Smill ... ..Ii..!l!!;i, 23 Sqlcmbcr 1995, p. 3G 

exercises appear to have leveled off. \Vhile it is true that a nation can engage in only so 
many exercises, it is noteworthy that despite an obvious reorientation towards maritime 
threat, there has been no equivalent bilateral effort in naval exercises. In addition, 
growth in bilateral ties between two countries in some cases is offending a third. [49 This 
demonstrates the difficulties attempts at multilateral arrangements wiJl experience 
ASEAN officials have stated concerns about their ability to retain control of security 
negotiations for Southeast Asia with great powers involved.150 Specifically, they have 
concerns emerging trum ARF meetings where extra-regional powers were begitUling to 
dominate the agenda 
Perhaps one of the Simplest and most effective steps that could be taken in the 
region is a dissemination of defense budget allocations. While publishing defense 
department totals are only marginally useful, releasing a breakdown of the budget would 
create transparency in the region . Malaysia bas proposed a regional anus register 
Without a listing of budget appropriations however, the utility and perceived integrity of 
the register would be limited. Specific spending figures wuuld enable other states to 
accurately gauge milital)' activity in the region, ultimately decreasing the intra-regional 
levels of perceived threat 
Overalllhe prognosis for CSBM's is relatively good Despite being in the middle 
of an anns race, the nations of Southeast Asia have taken it upon themselves to engage in 
discussiun about regional security issues This is a relatively rare phenomena and offers 
hope that the anns race will not end up in a anned conf1ict 
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U:-'1TED STATES 
A continued naval anns race in ASEAN is not in the best interest of the United 
States. Despite the economic benefits reaped from selling weapon system s to states in 
the region, and the enhanced abi lity to defend themselves against external aggressors, the 
resulting instability would cause greater harm. The United States relies on global 
stability as a basis for conducting trade. A destabilized Southeast Asia would seriously 
impact trade flows not only to North America, but to the rest of the world 
Continued build-ups \.\~11 ultimately pose greater risks to American military 
forces_ It is conceivable that some nations in the region (Indonesia especially) could 
develop a military sufficiently strong that it could impact American plans_ The United 
States .,.:iil continue to have a strategic interest in the various straits that offer passage 
through the region. A regional force that could threaten to selectively dose the straits, or 
to attack American forces transit ing would be a huge problem 
The United States must continue to support multilateral CSBM efforts in the 
region. By staying engaged in the process, and by continuing to keep forces in the region, 
the Uni ted States sends a message uf concern and interest.- a message which must be 
elearly heard. Doubt persists among some ASEAN members as to the extent and strength 
of American comm itment to and interest in the region. Every effort should be taken to 
remove these doubts. Failure to do so constitutes an error on the strategic scale 
APPENDIX 
The following material contains the data used to construct the graphs used in the 
thesis. Two sources were used 10 bui ld this database 
Bates Gi ll , IN Mak and Siemon Wezernon ASEAN Arms Acquisitions: Developing 
T ransoarency. (Jakana: Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, 1995), p. 32-73 
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